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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines whether participatory budgeting (PB) processes, as a 
case of participatory governance and an innovative approach to local governance, 
promote inclusive and deliberative government decision-making and social justice 
outcomes. The first chapter introduces the case of the dissertation, PB in the city of 
Seoul, South Korea. It reviews the history of PB and the literature on PB in South Korea 
and discusses three issues that arise when implementing legally mandated PB. The 
second chapter explores whether inclusive PB processes redistribute financial resources 
even without the presence of explicit equity criteria, using the last four years of PB 
resource allocation data and employing multi-level statistical analysis. The findings show 
that having a more inclusive process to encourage citizen participation helps poorer 
districts to win more resources than wealthier ones. The third chapter is a follow-up 
exploratory study; the possible reasons behind the redistributive effects of PB are 
discussed using interview data with PB participants. The findings suggest that the PB 
process could have been redistributive because it provided an opportunity for the people 
living in the comparatively poorer neighborhoods to participate in the government 
decision-making process. Additionally, when scoring proposals, participants valued 
‘needs’ and ‘urgency’ as the most important criteria. The last chapter examines the 32 PB 
meetings in order to find the combinations of conditions that lead to a deliberative 
participatory process, employing qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). This 
dissertation contributes to the field of public management, and particularly participatory 
governance by providing a review of the literature on PB in South Korea, presenting 
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empirical evidence on the redistributive effect of PB without explicit equity criteria, and 
finding the combinations of meeting conditions that could be used to promote 
deliberation in the context of PB.   
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Opening government by increasing public participation has been a long-debated 
issue among scholars and practitioners. It has been argued that allowing more people to 
be involved in government decision-making processes could enhance democratic values 
of participation, public freedom, government trust, and responsibility and that it could 
increase the legitimacy of the decisions (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007; Fung, 2015; Fung 
& Wright, 2003; King & Stivers, 1998; Olivo, 1998). Public participation could also 
provide local knowledge to public managers in order to help them make decisions that are 
more grounded in residents’ preferences. Ideally, the decisions that have been made 
through incorporating public input reflect the realistic needs of the residents better than 
the traditional decision-making process that relies solely on public officials. Although 
public participation is considered normatively desirable, there has been little empirical 
evidence on whether participation is also worth the effort in terms of enhancing the 
problem-solving capacity of governance systems. 
Engaging the public through participatory processes is not an easy task for public 
managers. Participatory government decision-making processes in practice are often 
criticized on the grounds of inclusiveness and effectiveness. First, inclusiveness of the 
process is often questioned (i.e., whether the community members are well represented). 
Prior research has shown that the most active participants tend to be individuals who have 
higher levels of income and education and hence are already enjoying advantages 
(Hansen & Reinau, 2006; Schlozman, Page, Verba, & Fiorina, 2005; Thornley, 1977). 
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There are many groups that are often difficult to reach out without additional efforts 
because they may incur a higher opportunity cost when attending community meetings, 
and others might have lower levels of political efficacy. Second, even when a 
participatory process is well designed to balance representation of the constituents, 
whether the decisions reflect well the constituents’ needs is a different matter. Public 
managers or elected leaders could merely consult with the constituents and still make 
decisions in favor of what the officials had already planned or what they desired in the 
first place.  
Beyond the level of direct participation, it is critical to consider how the decisions 
are made in the government decision-making process. Scholars have suggested that 
voting and deliberation are complementary (Ferejohn, 2008) and some have emphasized 
that the communication process is more important than the voting procedure (Ö berg, 
2016). In fact, it is possible to design the process merely for a public vote without any 
exchanges or deliberation. However, the literature suggests that public deliberation could 
help people clarify, understand, and refine their own preferences and positions on issues 
(Elster, 1998), distribute information better (Gambetta, 1998), and redistribute power 
among people, therefore enabling decision-making to be based on empirical facts rather 
than money or power (Fung & Wright, 2003). Recognizing such benefits of deliberation, 
many different practices such as deliberative polls (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2005) and 
citizen initiative reviews (Knobloch, Gastil, Reedy, & Cramer Walsh, 2013) have been 
implemented. 
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Participatory budgeting (PB), which allows community members to participate in 
local budget decision-making processes, is a relatively recent example of direct 
democratic governance practice. PB has the potential for achieving the goal of 
deliberative governance due to its design because participants are expected a priori to 
gather and discuss the community’s problems and envision solutions before casting a 
vote. Even though the deliberative process has been considered a core aspect of PB 
(Leighninger & Rinehart, 2016), there is still a lack of empirical evidence on the 
dynamics and the quality of such deliberation.  
This dissertation pursues the following objectives: 1) explore the main issues and 
challenges in legally mandated participatory processes, 2) analyze resource distribution 
through participatory processes, 3) explore why redistribution occurs through 
participatory processes even in the absence of an equity principle, and 4) evaluate the 
quality of deliberation in participatory meetings and delineate the set of key institutional 
conditions of meetings that lead to a deliberative process.  
In order to address these objectives, this dissertation consists of four individual 
studies, which are complemented by an introductory chapter and a concluding chapter. 
Each study answers one of the following research questions: 
1. What are the issues that arise when implementing legally mandated 
participation?  
2. Do participatory processes redistribute resources even without explicit equity 
principles? 
3. According to participants, what makes a participatory process redistributive? 
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4. What are the key determinants of a deliberative meeting?  
This dissertation is a multi-methodological project employing both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods over four individual studies. Research methods include: 
1) literature review of scholarly articles on PB and related literature, 2) multi-level 
regression/logistic regression analysis of resource allocations in PB, 3) interviews with 
PB participants (committee members) and content analysis of the interview records/notes, 
and 4) qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) using PB committee meeting records. 
PB in Seoul, South Korea is the case employed in this dissertation. Seoul PB is an 
appropriate and meaningful case to study the research questions in this study for at least 
three reasons. First, South Korea is one of a few countries around the world which has 
mandated public participation in government budgeting process by national law. In 
addition to South Korea, the Dominican Republic and Peru mandated PB for all 
municipalities (Dias, 2014). In South Korea, participatory budgeting was mandated in 
2011 by the revision of the national law on local finance. Second, PB was adopted in 
South Korea as a tool to increase public participation in the government decision-making 
process. In other words, there are no explicit equity criteria in the Seoul PB process, 
unlike the case of Porto Alegre, Brazil (de Sousa Santos, 1998; Fung, 2015; Marquetti, 
Schonerwald da Silva, & Campbell, 2012; Wampler, 2000). Third, full records of 
speeches in PB meetings are rarely found around the world. However, the city 
government of Seoul started to provide full meeting records—not summarized minutes—
starting in 2016.  
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This dissertation studies PB as a case of participatory governance and provides 
theoretical and empirical contributions to the fields of public participation and 
deliberative democracy. Although public participation and deliberation in government 
decision-making processes have been widely studied in several different fields such as 
public administration and policy, political science, sociology, and communication 
studies, certain aspects of PB are still not well known to academics and to government 
officials. In particular, this dissertation examines how inclusive, participatory decision-
making processes distribute public resources. This study adds empirical evidence to the 
theoretical argument that public participation produces decisions that well reflect 
residents’ preferences. In addition, this research examines whether participatory 
budgeting allows those population groups that have been neglected in the traditional 
government decision-making to actually participate and whether the decisions favor the 
people most in need. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, this research is the first 
empirical study to analyze the deliberative dimensions of PB using meeting records. This 
study also discusses how to manage institutional characteristics and factors in order to 
promote deliberation in decision-making processes. Based on the findings of the four 
research chapters, this research makes recommendations to balance direct and 
deliberative governance.  
. 
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Chapter 2 
MANDATED PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN SOUTH KOREA 
Since it was first adopted in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989, participatory budgeting 
(PB) has spread to over 1,500 cities around the world. The way each jurisdiction 
implements PB varies with different social, political, and cultural contexts (G. Choi, 
2004; Goldfrank, 2007). In a few countries such as the Dominican Republic, Peru, and 
South Korea, PB is mandated by law for all municipalities (Dias, 2014). In South Korea, 
PB was mandated by the revision of the national law on local finance in 2011.  
Understanding how PB became mandated is important because it provides not 
only the historical and political context of the different cases but also the basis for 
exploring the effects of process design. In Peru, national decentralization reform in 2002 
was a trigger to establish several participatory institutions. In this country, PB was 
mandated by the Participatory Budget Law in 2003 and its revision in 2009 (McNulty, 
2012a). The reform was part of the efforts that aimed to clean up corruption in politics 
after the authoritarian Fujimori regime (McNulty, 2012a, 2014). It is important to note 
that the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) was the main actor in this reform, 
which reflected the citizens’ demands for change to address the lack of transparency in 
funding decision-making processes (McNulty, 2012a, 2014). In the Dominican Republic, 
PB became mandatory for all municipalities in the nation in 2007 with the adoption of 
two National Laws, which were later transformed in a constitutional amendment in 2010 
(García, 2014). One noticeable aspect of this case is that the methodological guide that 
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was prepared for PB practice was transcribed into the law, in contrast, to the more 
common case of laws being made while not considering the participants (García, 2014).  
Several scholars have studied some of the accomplishments and challenges of the 
mandated cases of PB. For instance, for the case of Peru, McNulty (2014) states that the 
success of PB was possible because it was mandated, but also because it remained 
flexible: her interviews with officials reveal that the laws on the books helped engage 
new actors in local decision-making processes. McNulty (2014) noted that although the 
Peruvian law requires government officials to hold meetings, it is not guaranteed that 
those meetings would be truly participatory. For this reason, PB advocates in Peru ask for 
stronger sanctions that would prevent officials from manipulating the PB process. 
Similarly, in the Dominican Republic, García (2014) reports that two laws and the 
Constitution have set forth the process, and points out that even though the process is 
mandated for all municipalities, its implementation still depends on the political will of 
the heads of local government. In addition, when the financial capability of the 
municipality is low and thus cannot respond to the needs of the citizens, participatory 
processes such as PB disappointed citizens when they saw that their participation had no 
results (García, 2014).  
It is still not clear, however, whether the success and challenges suggested in the 
literature regarding the other cases of PB were mainly because PB was mandated or 
because of the nature of PB itself. In this regard, this paper provides a thorough review of 
how PB was mandated in South Korea and to identify challenges in South Korean PB in 
the context of legally mandated PB.  
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History of PB in South Korea 
PB in South Korea is rooted in decentralization reform and the expansion of civil 
society organizations. In 1995, South Korea changed the way of electing local 
government leaders from indirect to direct election, and any citizens over 18 years old 
became eligible to vote for the leaders of the district, city, town, and/or state. The total 
population of South Korea was about 45 million in 1995. Koreans started to realize not 
only that they have the right to vote, but also that there are many other ways they could 
participate in government decision-making processes. Each local government became 
autonomous and could focus more on local issues than in the past when the central 
government ruled the whole country. At the same time, many local civil society 
organizations (CSOs) emerged (Ahn, 2013). 
The very first mode of public participation in the government budgeting process 
that the CSOs actively engaged was monitoring. This was not direct participation itself, 
but since 2000 the CSOs held many different budget-monitoring workshops nationwide. 
Those CSOs interested in civic participation in the government budgeting process formed 
the “budget monitoring network” and advocated for adopting PB. Based on these CSOs’ 
activities, in the June 2002 general election, the Democratic-Labor Party (a left-wing 
party) first adopted PB as one of their main campaign pledges. Before forming their 
pledges regarding PB, the South Korean Democratic-Labor party had communicated with 
the Brazilian Labor party (Lee, 2014). Although the party won only 0.1% of the seats, it 
was the first time in the country that the possibility of implementing PB was officially 
discussed.  
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The full-fledged efforts of adopting PB started when Moo-hyun ROH was elected 
President in December 2002 and named his cabinet “participatory government.” Two of 
his main presidential agenda items were government innovation and decentralization. On 
this basis, in “the roadmap for promoting decentralization in the participatory 
government,” adopting PB was suggested, by the government advisory committee, as a 
way of institutionalizing the increase of public participation in the policy process (The 
government innovation and decentralization committee, 2003). Moreover, in July 2003, 
the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) suggested local 
governments increase public participation in their budget formulation process by 
conducting online surveys and holding public hearings and meetings (Kwak, 2005).  
Within this social context, the first PB case started in 2003 in the City of 
Gwangju, the sixth-largest city by population in the country (about 1.35 million in 2000). 
Bukgu, a district in the City of Gwangju, first started by installing a PB committee, then 
establishing its own PB ordinance in the next following year for the first time (Lee, 
2014). Adopting PB was one of the pledges of the district head, who was from the same 
party as the President (Kim & Schachter, 2013). Although it was the very first case in 
South Korea that named the program “participatory budgeting,” the type of participation 
allowed in the first year was close to a public consultation rather than co-production or 
empowerment because the district head was in charge of constituting the PB committee 
and calling for meetings. The voluntary participative culture was not yet formed to make 
the PB active (Nah, 2005). 
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After then, following the strong will of President Moo-hyun ROH, the Local 
Finance Act was revised to encourage active involvement of residents in the local budget 
preparation process in 2005. At that time, the Local Finance Act opened the possibility of 
including residents in the budgeting process. Article 39 (Residents' Participation in 
Budget Compilation Process of Local Governments) states that “the heads of local 
governments may set and implement procedures for residents to participate in the process 
of compiling their budgets under the conditions prescribed by the Presidential Decree” 
(KLRI, n.d.a). Meanwhile, Article 46 (Procedures for Residents to Participate in the 
process of Compiling Budgets of Local Governments) of the Enforcement Decree of the 
Local Finance Act listed the ways that residents can participate in the budget preparation 
process as 1) public hearings or informal gatherings for discussion of major projects; 2) 
written or Internet question surveys on major projects; 3) the public offering of projects; 
4) other means to appropriately solicit the opinions of residents, as prescribed by 
Municipal Ordinance (KLRI, n.d.a). Also, specific aspects of operation such as the scope 
of the budget, the procedures, and the means of PB should be prescribed by the 
Municipal Ordinance of each local government.  
Following this revision of the law, 91 of 244 local governments (41.8%) in South 
Korea established PB ordinances during the five-year period 2005-2010 (Song, 2013). In 
October 2010, the MOPAS suggested three exemplary models as guidelines to facilitate 
local governments’ PB adoption and implementation: (1) optional installation of a PB 
general committee, (2) required the installation of a PB general committee, and (3) 
required the installation of a PB general committee and thematic subcommittees. 
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During this time, the national congress had been preparing another revision of the 
Local Finance Act that made PB compulsory for all local government units in the 
country. After this revision in 2011, public involvement was mandated in two ways: 1) 
heads of local governments were required to establish procedures that allowed resident 
participation in local public budgeting processes, and 2) heads of local governments were 
required to enclose written statements that included residents’ opinions of the budget 
proposal and submit them to the local council. Although all local governments were 
required to guarantee public participation in the budgeting process, they still had a certain 
degree of discretion in deciding how and to what extent they would involve people, from 
consulting to allowing them to make decisions.  
After the second revision of the Local Finance Act, as of August 2014, 241 of 243 
local governments (99.1%), including the city government of Seoul and its 25 district 
governments, established their own PB ordinances (Seoul PB, 2014). It took about 14 
months for all 25 districts in Seoul to first adopt PB in any way by establishing 
ordinances, regardless of whether they had implemented PB in practice from the last day 
of December 2010 to February 2012. Even though there is no penalty for noncompliance, 
almost all local governments in South Korea had complied with the PB requirement. This 
could be attributed to many different reasons, but three possible explanations can be 
advanced. The first is that the central government incentivized local governments by 
including “whether the local government established its own PB ordinance” to the local 
finance analysis index, which is used as a basis of financial support for local governments 
(Park & Choi, 2009). The second is that an administrative culture of traditional authority 
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remains in South Korea that expects local governments to comply with requirements 
from higher government levels without any question (Jeong & Kim, 2012; Seong, 1999). 
The third is that changes in the governance system making heads of local governments 
directly elected by citizens have formed political motivations for heads of local 
governments to become more accountable to citizens by involving them more in 
decision-making processes (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011).  
 
Trends in Research 
In order to review the research topics related to PB dealt in the Korean literature, I 
archived 119 articles—from both peer-reviewed scholarly journals and non-scholarly 
periodicals such as magazines or reports. I used two keywords in the search: 1) 
“주민참여예산” /ju-min-cham-yeo ye-san/, which is the official term used in South 
Korea to call PB that can be directly translated as “resident participation budgeting” and 
“참여예산”/cham-yeo ye-san/, which is directly translated as  “participation budgeting.” 
Two well-known Korean research article databases were used: 1) DBpia 
(www.dbpia.co.kr) and 2) Korean studies Information Service System 
(www.kiss.kstudy.com). 
Scholars in South Korea recognized PB starting in 2001. Figure 2.1 presents the 
trends in the type of research on PB in the peer-reviewed journals. 
The trend goes along with the emergence and implementation of PB practices in 
South Korea. Until 2004, most of the scholars only focused on introducing other 
countries’ cases such as Brazil and Japan (Kwak, 2003; Nah, 2004) and the trend 
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continued until recently (Ahn, 2005; Ahn, 2007; Lee, 2007; Lee, 2008; Lee, 2011). The 
first case study article appeared in 2005 (Kwak, 2005) and case study still has been a 
popular type of research until now (Cho, 2015; Hong, 2013; Jeon, 2008; Jeong, 2014; 
Kang, 2011; Kim & Lee, 2009; Kim, 2008; Kim, 2015). Statistical studies started to 
appear in 2007 and have been a main type of research in addition to case study since 
2010 (Choi, 2010; Jang & Yeom, 2014; Jung, Kim, & Kim, 2014; Kim & Lee, 2011; Kim 
& Hyun, 2016; Kwon, Lee, & Hwang, 2015; Lee & Hur, 2016; Lee & Lee, 2017; Park & 
Nam, 2012; Um & Yoon, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Trends in the Type of Research on PB in South Korea 2003-2017 
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After the emergence of PB in several municipalities, scholars started to conduct 
empirical analysis. Scholars have been mainly focused on categorizing the types of PB, 
evaluating the cases, and finding the factors affecting the processes and outcomes. Table 
2.1 shows the different categories of distinguishing types of PB. Yoon and Lim (2016) 
point out that most of the Korean PBs (76%) falls into either the type of providing 
opinions or the type of operating general committees. In addition, Table 2.2 presents the 
variables appeared in the literature on Korean PB.  
 
Table 2.1  
Types of PB in South Korea   
Source       Types of PB 
Ahn (2007) 1) Government-led participation, 2) Collaboration between 
citizens and government (passive collaboration), 3) 
Collaboration between citizens and government (active 
collaboration), & 4) Citizens-led participation 
Lee & Hwang 
(2013) 
1) Operating general committees, 2) Operating regional 
committees, & 3) Collaboration between citizens and 
government 
Yoon & Lim 
(2016) 
1) Providing opinions (no committees) (41.1%), 2) Operating 
general committees (34.9%), 3) Operating regional committees 
(8.6%), 4) Collaboration between citizens and government 
(12.3%), & 5) Delegating authority (2.8%) 
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Table 2.2  
Variables appeared in the literature on Korea PB   
Categories Variables 
1. Elected officials and public 
managers 
- Awareness and perceived needs of PB 
- Political attitudes and progressiveness 
- Enthusiasm, support  
2. Council members - Awareness and perceived needs of PB 
- Political attitudes and progressiveness 
- Cooperation 
3. Structure of local administration - Transparency in budget formation 
- Providing good quality of budget information 
- The scope of eligible participants 
- Scope of budget formation process and areas 
allowing participation 
- The ways (means) of participation  
4. Residents - Interest, attitudes, willingness to participate 
and desire to participate 
- Organizational power of residents 
- Leadership and leverage 
- Characteristics of resident organizations 
- Civic awareness and values 
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5. Environment - Autonomy and independence from the central 
government 
- Years of PB ordinance establishment 
- Development of media  
- Civil society organizations’ capacities and 
support 
- Trust between local government and 
residents (social capital) 
- City size and population 
- Budget size and financial self-independence 
6. Internal factors of PB - Number of PB committees  
- The degree of sharing decision-making 
authority  
- Types of subcommittees 
Source: Adapted from Choi (2011), translated, and modified.  
 
Issues and Challenges in PB in South Korea 
Although involving the public in the budgeting process is legalized and mandated 
for all local government units in South Korea, there are many issues and challenges. In 
the next part of this paper, I present three issues that currently concern those who are 
interested in PB in South Korea.  
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Government-led Process 
One interesting characteristic of the PB process in South Korea is that the 
facilitation of the bottom-up process has been initiated through a top-down approach. 
This is because budget formation authority is given to the administration, and budget 
ratification is in charge of the council. It is “opening up” one part of the budgeting 
formulation process that has been considered the sole purview of the government. 
Therefore, deciding the scope of participation (inclusiveness) and implementing the 
winning projects are the responsibility of the local governments themselves.  
First, it is the electoral leader’s will (e.g., Mayors) to decide whether to fully 
implement PB, which allows the public to make real decisions or to involve the public in 
a limited way, consulting through public meetings or surveys. As a result, although most 
local governments (99.1%) established their PB ordinances, there are only a few local 
governments that fully implement PB. Seoul city’s PB was adopted and implemented 
because of Mayor Won-Soon PARK’s strong will to enhance public participation as a 
new mode of governance for the city, embracing not only ordinary citizens but also city 
councils and civil society organizations (Park, 2015). When the adoption of a government 
process relies too much on one leader’s will, the continuity and stability of that process 
can be easily questioned when there is a change in leadership. In summer 2017, Seoul PB 
had its sixth cycle, and it is the last year of the current Mayor’s second term. In other 
words, it is still uncertain whether Seoul PB will continue its seventh cycle if people elect 
a different Mayor in next year’s national election. This is mainly due to the generic 
language of the Local Finance Law, which allows any type of participation. Since the 
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national law cannot regulate the specific type of participation, it can result in various 
types of implementation, including disguised compliance.  
Second, PB processes are completely designed and managed by the government. 
When designing the process, it seems that some government officials have hesitated to 
fully “give up” their control of budget decision-making. In the city of Busan, for 
example, one-third of the PB committee was initially constituted of city officials 
(Junghee Kim, 2016). One of the reasons for this is that there were no public meetings or 
hearings at the stage of forming or establishing a PB ordinance (Kim, 2016). In addition, 
PB committee meetings are sometimes managed in a way that is more convenient for 
government officials than for the residents. PB committee meetings are usually held in 
government offices (e.g., city office, district office), and government officials are in 
charge of preparing the meetings. Since government officials have to be present all the 
time, they tend not to set meetings on holidays. In Seoul, PB committee meetings were 
held on weekday evenings, which made the participants rush tasks, leave early in the 
middle of the meetings, and difficult to even attend the meetings if they have families and 
children to take care.  
Whom to Involve?  
In a literal translation, the PB in South Korea is called “Resident Participatory 
Budgeting System.” Taking this into account, it is important to clarify who are 
considered residents in the system, because the scope of eligible participants shapes the 
outcomes of PB (Chang, 2006). According to Smith (1997), there are three types of 
citizens: customer, owner, and value-centered citizens. Neither a customer purchasing 
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government services nor an owner exercising his or her limited rights, citizens can be 
recognized as a value-centered citizen through PB—collaborating with the government 
for the development of the community (Choi, 2011). According to the Local Autonomy 
Act, persons who “have domicile within the jurisdiction of a local government” shall be 
residents of such local governments (KLRI, n.d.b). However, the Seoul PB ordinance 
defines residents more broadly. It defines a “resident” as someone who 1) has an address 
in the city of Seoul, 2) works in an institution located in the city of Seoul, 3) is a 
representative or employee of a business that has its head office or branches in the city of 
Seoul, and/or 4) are currently enrolled in elementary/middle/high schools or universities 
in the city of Seoul. Moreover, there is an additional condition as to who is allowed to 
participate: the definition of a resident excludes public officials who work in the city 
government of Seoul or any other local government or government-funded organizations.  
This broad scope of resident defined by the city of Seoul is understandable since 
anyone who lives and/or works in the city can be considered beneficiaries of the city’s 
administrative activities. However, other cities surrounding the city of Seoul may allow 
only those who live in the city to participate in their PB. This inconsistency may also 
cause some conflicts of interest. Seoul, where approximately 10 million people reside, 
has been the capital of the nation for a long time in Korean history. Due to the rapid 
growth of the area since the 1970s, all the nation’s social, economic, and cultural 
opportunities are mainly concentrated in this area. People started to move out to suburban 
areas and still commute to work in Seoul because of the skyrocketing housing and rent 
prices. In 2015, about 1.28 million people commuted from Gyeonggi-do (the province 
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surrounding the city of Seoul) to Seoul (Statistics Korea, 2015). Since many people work 
in one city but live in a different one, some might be involved in PB processes in two or 
more cities. It will not be problematic if all cities allow everyone who lives and/or works 
in the city. If there are certain cities not allowing those who work in the city participate in 
PB unlike other cities around them, the process may not be considered fair.     
In addition, there are no specific clauses in the law to make sure the process 
includes those who have been traditionally neglected. One of the common criticisms 
regarding participatory processes in government is that often end up including the ‘usual 
suspects’ that is, residents with higher levels of education and income, who already have 
some degree of influence and power because those groups can be comparatively easier to 
engage. In other countries, PB sometimes became a tool for the government to maintain 
the status quo of the participation through the cooptation of actors (Wampler, 2008). 
However, if the government aims to increase inclusiveness in their decision-making 
processes, it should make an effort to increase the participation of people from 
traditionally neglected groups such as the youth, the disabled, and multicultural families. 
Seoul PB has tried different ways of including youth and multicultural families, but there 
is still a lack of available participation avenues for those groups. For example, they once 
included teenagers in the PB committee meetings and expected them to join the meetings 
in the late evenings. However, it was difficult for some young students not only to 
participate meaningfully but also to stay until the end of each meeting. Mothers of 
multicultural families participated as committee members, but they encountered some 
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language barriers because the meetings used very formal Korean, which sometimes might 
be not easy for them to understand, and no translations were provided. 
Scope of the Mandate 
We also need to consider the scope of the mandate–what kinds of activities are 
exactly mandated throughout the local budgeting process. First of all, strictly speaking, 
some might disagree that “PB” is mandated in South Korea. This is a plausible argument 
given the various definitions of PB. A broad definition of PB describes it as “a 
mechanism (or process) through which the population decides on or contributes to 
decisions made on, the destination of all or part of the available public resources” (UN-
Habitat, 2007, p. 20). Under this broad definition, PB could include any participation 
such as “lobbying, general town hall meetings, special public hearings or referendums on 
specific budget items” (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 92). Meanwhile, a narrow definition 
understands PB as “a process that is open to any citizen who wants to participate, 
combines direct and representative democracy, involves deliberation (not merely 
consultation), redistributes resources toward the poor, and is self-regulating” (Goldfrank, 
2007, p. 92). In this regard, what is mandated by the South Korean national law could be 
considered as PB only under the broader definition, because it is still acceptable to simply 
consult with citizens without giving them any decision-making authority.  
Second, although involving the public to some degree is mandatory, the rest of the 
PB process has not been mandated. On the one hand, implementing the winning projects 
is not required in the law, and the decisions are not legally binding (Kim, 2015). Indeed, 
legally speaking, there is no penalty for not implementing the winning projects. In other 
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words, the projects have no formal way of being realized if the council does not pass it, 
or if the local government leader does not implement at the end. There has been no such 
problem so far in the case of Seoul, but not implementing the projects due to budget 
limitation has been an issue in other countries (see García, 2014). If a project cannot be 
realized after all these participatory processes, it will negatively affect the participants’ 
trust in the process and their motivation to participate in the future. On the other hand, the 
law does not regulate anything relative to the quality of participation. Seoul adopted a 
mobile vote to increase participation in the final stages of PB, but as a result, more people 
merely voted without deliberation, compared to the previous cycles. Before the mobile 
vote was installed, all voters had to come to the city hall, and there was some deliberation 
occurring between residents before the final vote.  
 
Conclusion 
Although PB in South Korea has spread widely following the mandate in 2011, 
awareness of PB is still low among citizens. One reason could be that there are still many 
local government units not fully implementing PB in the narrow definition: residents 
making decisions after deliberation. By 2014, 99% of local government units had 
established their own PB ordinances. The implementation of PB, however, varies to a 
great extent, from consultation to decision-making due to the way the law regulates 
participation. Indeed, involving the public and reflecting their opinions in budgeting 
decision-making processes can be done through either holding public meetings or giving 
residents the power to deliberate and make decisions.  
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In this article, I summarized the history of PB and introduced three issues with 
regard to the mandate of PB in South Korea. First, could the current government-led 
process be more open? In order to make the process more participatory, the government 
needs to consider whether it could hand over the authority of managing the process to the 
PB general committee. The government could be involved in the process as one of the 
participating institutions, together with other civil society organizations. Second, the 
definition of participants needs to be clear. Although the current national law defines 
residents as persons who have a domicile in the area, PB sometimes more broadly defines 
residents to include those who work within the area. Currently, the involvement of 
traditionally neglected groups such as youth and minorities is not included in the 
mandate. Third, the mandate only requires each local government unit to include the 
public in the budgeting process. In other words, the decisions made through PB are not 
legally binding.  
It has been about fifteen years since the first PB experiment in South Korea, and 
six years after the mandate. It is time to reflect on and consider the achievements and 
failures of the mandate. In 2017, South Korea elected another President, Moon Jae-In, 
who values citizen participation and claims a willingness to listen to citizens. Despite the 
language barrier, communicating with other countries that have mandated PB and sharing 
experiences would be an asset to all PB communities around the world.   
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Chapter 3 
INCREASING SOCIAL EQUITY THROUGH PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 
Opening government and increasing public participation have been a long-
standing debate among scholars and practitioners. It has been argued that involving more 
people in government decision-making processes could enhance democratic values of 
participation, public freedom, and responsibility, so as to increase the legitimacy of 
governmental decisions (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007; Fung, 2015; Fung & Wright, 2003; 
King & Stivers, 1998; Olivo, 1998). Public participation could also offer local knowledge 
that public officials might lack. The proposition is that decisions made through public 
participation processes could better reflect the actual needs of the populace compared to 
the traditional decision-making process, which relies solely on public officials (Irvin & 
Stansbury, 2004). Although public participation is considered normatively desirable 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007; Stivers, 1990), and suggested to help to achieve social 
justice (for instance, by increasing equity in resource allocation by distributing more 
resources toward the poor) there has been little empirical evidence as to whether citizen 
participation is worth the effort for enhancing social justice in governance systems. 
This article examines whether participatory governance processes increase social 
equity in resources allocation. Participatory Budgeting (PB), which allows community 
members to participate in the local budget decision-making process is a relatively recent 
example of participatory governance practice. In particular, this study explores whether 
the inclusive structures of those participatory processes have any relationship to 
redistributive allocation outcomes, using the case of PB in Seoul, South Korea, where the 
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PB was introduced as a way of increasing public participation in government decision-
making without an explicit consideration for redistribution of resources. In the context of 
this study, an “inclusive” process refers to the level of representation and participation of 
traditionally excluded groups and “social justice” refers to the redistribution of resource 
allocations from high-income to low-income districts. 
The literature shows that when PB is designed with explicit equity criteria—as 
was the first case of PB in Porto Alegre, Brazil—redistribution was successfully achieved 
whereby resources are allocated to the economically and educationally disadvantaged (de 
Sousa Santos, 1998; Fung, 2015; Marquetti et al., 2012; Wampler, 2000). The equity 
criteria used in Porto Alegre, however, have seldomly been adopted by other cities. In 
fact, Archon Fung (2005) argues that social justice could still be reached even if not 
explicitly articulated as desired goals. In resource allocation, social justice outcome refers 
to redistribution, considering equity criteria. Social justice can become a byproduct when 
seeking legitimacy from the populace through the design of an inclusive, representative, 
and discursive (deliberative) process (Fung, 2015; Purdy, 2012). Moreover, when trying 
to enhance effective governance by improving the problem-solving capacity of the 
government through participation, some governments have designed a co-production 
process in which communities are involved in planning and design (Bovaird, 2007). In 
sum, in the pursuit of legitimacy and effective governance, participatory processes gather 
views from previously excluded groups and deliver public goods and services to those 
who are disadvantaged, therefore indirectly achieve social justice (Fung, 2015). In this 
regard, it is pertinent to empirically test if the redistributive effects of PB are present even 
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in the absence of explicit equity criteria, and explore the governance processes that are 
linked to social equity outcomes.  
This study offers important contributions to the field of participatory governance 
because it offers empirical evidence for the link between civic participation and social 
justice outcomes. In other words, this study tests whether inclusive structures increase 
equity in resource allocation. In addition, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
study to examine PB distribution outcomes across multiple years by considering both 
project-level and district-level characteristics.   
 
Participatory Governance, Participatory Budgeting, and Inclusiveness 
Participatory governance system benefits both the government and the public. By 
involving the public, the government can advance at least three democratic governance 
values–effectiveness, legitimacy, and social justice, depending on how the processes are 
designed (Fung, 2006, 2015). Increasing participation could help public agencies improve 
the capacity of problem-solving by drawing on more information and resources from 
citizens, advance legitimacy by improving the representativeness and responsiveness, and 
achieve social justice by making the previously excluded groups (e.g., low-income 
households) participate (Fung, 2006). In addition, from the citizen’s perspective, citizens 
could enhance their efficacy, competence, and trust in government (Cooper, Bryer, & 
Meek, 2006) by participating in government decision-making process and therefore 
become empowered as well (Buckwalter, 2014). Although often elusive, citizen 
empowerment could be realized when the participatory process is cooperative rather than 
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control-based (Buckwalter, 2014). In this regard, PB is considered as a pertinent example 
of participatory governance.  
In particular, PB is a good case to explore the relationship between the process 
and its social justice outcome. A broad definition PB describes it as “a mechanism (or 
process) through which the population decides on, or contributes to decisions made on, 
the destination of all or part of the available public resources” (UN-Habitat, 2007, p. 20). 
Under this definition, PB could include any participation such as “lobbying, general town 
hall meetings, special public hearings or referendums on specific budget items” 
(Goldfrank, 2007, p. 92). Meanwhile, a narrower definition understands PB as “a 
decision-making process through which citizens deliberate and negotiate over the 
distribution of public resources” (Wampler, 2007, p. 21). When following the narrow 
definition, what distinguishes PB from other participation mechanisms such as citizen 
advisory boards, citizens’ juries or public meetings, is that citizens have the highest 
decision-making control and delegated authority by partnering with officials (Stewart, 
2007).  
Increasing public participation in government budgeting process can achieve and 
yield several different goals and outcomes. Participation in budgeting process allows 
“changing resource allocation, educating citizens, collecting input for decision-making, 
gaining support for proposals, reducing cynicism, enhancing trust, and creating a sense of 
community” (Edbon & Franklin, 2006, p. 438). One of the common criticisms about 
public participation in the budgeting process is that citizen inputs are used to merely back 
up the directions of public officials intended rather than making real changes in resource 
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allocation (Edbon & Franklin, 2006). In PB, however, resource allocation completely 
depends on how the process goes, because citizens replace traditionally authorized 
decision makers (e.g., public officials and technical experts) and make decisions by 
themselves (Fung, 2006). Furthermore, PB can be considered a collaborative governance 
process. Purdy (2012) defines a collaborative governance process as a process that “seek 
to share power in decision making with stakeholders in order to develop shared 
recommendations for effective, lasting solutions to public problems” (p. 409). The design 
of PB process allows the public to share the decision-making power with public officials. 
In addition, even though economically disadvantaged citizens are less likely to 
participate in general local government participatory processes (e.g., town committee and 
board) (Arceneaux & Butler, 2015), PB has been successful in involving citizens from 
traditionally underrepresented groups such as women, low-income households, and those 
with lower education levels (Baiocchi, 2003; Fung, 2006; Marquetti et al., 2012; 
McNulty, 2012b). It is important to reiterate that the redistributive resource allocation 
through PB, however, was possible in Porto Alegre, Brazil because they intentionally 
developed a set of explicit criteria on equity following the central goal of the program, 
allocating the resources to low-income neighborhoods (Marquetti et al., 2012; Wampler, 
2000). Whether social justice could be unintendedly achieved, as suggested by Fung 
(2015) when increasing inclusiveness in PB, is the focus in this article.  
Social justice can be achieved, however, even when it is not explicitly intended 
(Fung, 2015). In the pursuit of legitimacy and effective governance, participatory 
processes gather views from previously excluded groups and deliver public goods and 
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services to those who are disadvantaged, therefore indirectly achieve social justice (Fung, 
2015).  
In this regard, inclusiveness is a critical factor when assessing a participatory 
process in terms of achieving social justice. In order to promote democratic values, the 
scope of participatory processes must be expanded for increasing inclusiveness (Box, 
1998; King & Stivers, 1998). Although differently conceptualized and measured in 
several empirical studies, there are two dominant dimensions of inclusiveness in the 
literature related to participatory processes: representation and participation (Rossmann 
& Shanahan, 2012).  
A participatory process needs to involve those people outside of the government 
significantly; whom to involve or how to represent the values of constituencies are the 
matters of representation (Rossmann & Shanahan, 2012). The design of the process needs 
to consider not only the number of participants involved in each meeting and in total, but 
also the representation of the people regarding gender, age, ethnicity, and geographic 
distribution (Roberts, 2010; Weeks, 2000). Bringing in different perspectives is important 
to represent the values of constituencies as much as possible and to allow the participants 
to have a better understanding of different issues and therefore enhance the process as 
well as the implementation of the decisions (Feldman & Khademian, 2007).  
The other consideration is related to the level and quality of engagement and the 
structural opportunities for participation (Rossmann & Shanahan, 2012). Bryson et al. 
(2012) suggest that inclusiveness of composition of participants could be considered as 
one of the possible outcome evaluation criteria for practitioners when they aim to 
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promote democratic participation. Hong (2015) uses the definition of inclusiveness which 
refers to “the openness of the political system and the degree (p. 273).” While some 
scholars focus on the number of individuals involved (Ebdon, 2002), others consider the 
structural avenues for participation such as public meetings,  panels of focus groups, 
community visioning, advisory boards, open house discussions, and survey (see Beckett 
and King, 2002, p. 477). In this regard, an inclusive process refers to the process which 
provides various structural avenues to achieve a high level of participation and 
representation, in this research.  
A few prior studies have found some negative effects of inclusiveness on different 
participatory outcomes. Hong (2015), for instance, argued that greater inclusiveness may 
hinder active citizen engagement in the budgeting process by decreasing the sense of 
ownership of each individual over the resulting decisions, thereby lowering a 
participant’s engagement in the process. Moynihan (2003) claimed that including more 
people in the process increases costs and hinders reaching consensus and moving forward 
in making decisions, making the budgetary decision-making process less efficient. In 
addition, large but unrepresentative participation may fail to accurately reflect the needs 
of the citizens (Weeks, 2000).  
Nevertheless, other scholars show that increasing inclusiveness has a great 
potential to improve representativeness and effectiveness in the participation processes 
(Bryson et al., 2012; Fung & Wright, 2003). Increasing participatory representativeness is 
possible through better outreach and optimizing accessibility of the process, therefore, 
have diverse inputs (Bryson et al., 2012). In other words, including those who are 
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traditionally neglected and disadvantaged (Bryson et al., 2012; Fung & Wright, 2003) 
would contribute to a better reflection of the community’s needs. Therefore, an inclusive 
process may redistribute resources if those who are in need will receive more resources at 
the end.  
Based on the discussion above, the proposed hypotheses are as follows:  
H1: A district that provides more structural avenues for participation would receive 
more resources than their counterparts.   
H2: Districts with lower average household incomes would receive more resources 
than their wealthier counterparts. 
 
The Research Setting 
The city of Seoul, the capital of South Korea, adopted PB in December 2011. 
Currently, the national law, Local Finance Act, requires all local governments in the 
country to involve the public in their budgeting processes. They, however, still have a 
certain degree of discretion in deciding how and to what extent they would involve 
people, from consulting to decision making. Even though there is no penalty in the law 
for noncompliance, almost all local governments in South Korea complied with the PB 
requirement nonetheless because of the incentives provided by the central government. 
The Seoul city PB can be considered as a compelling case in its PB structural 
design. This article examines PB processes at the district-level for three reasons. First, 
districts are the smallest autonomous government units in a city; they collect taxes and 
operate their own budgets. Second, they are very close to the community, which makes it 
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easy to reach out to residents. Third, among the 246 local government units of South 
Korea, Seoul city and its 25 districts have a unique hierarchical structure for PB. The 
city-level PB allocates the funds for the winning projects to the district governments in 
which the projects are located. In this setting, the districts compete with each other in the 
city-level PB which results in expanding district-level budgets. In other words, the more 
projects a district win in the city-level PB, the more funds it can add to the district 
coffers. In other words, even though it is mandated to do PB, the design of the PB process 
provides financial incentives for district governments to participate in the city-level PB. 
This becomes a great motivation for district governments to manage PB well to win more 
projects and funds.  
The Seoul city government operates PB with a budget of 50 billion Korean won 
(KRW) (about 43 million USD) every year. Any resident in the city can submit project 
ideas and proposals directly to the city or their district. There are two tracks in the Seoul 
city PB. One track is directly open to the public, and the other track is designated for the 
regional committees. There is a ceiling amount for the districts, but no regional quota in 
the final vote. Each district cannot submit projects whose budgets exceed 30 billion KRW 
in total. The district-level committees review district-specific proposals and make the 
initial decision on the priority of the projects, and citizen delegates in the city-level 
thematic committees review all proposals and again filter those that do not qualify or are 
impossible to implement for legal or financial reasons. Citizen delegates and regular 
citizens vote on the projects brought to the general meeting in the final stage.1 In the very 
final step, the city council approves the winning projects unless the council finds one 
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disqualified. Although the amount allocated to PB represents less than 1% of the Seoul 
city budget, a great deal of projects is approved and implemented within the funds of 50 
billion KRW every year.    
 
Data and Methods 
This study is based on original data collection and coding of data on individual 
PB project proposals.2 The information on each proposal such as location, amount of 
funds requested and allocated, final status, themes, purpose, description, and the results 
of committee screening is from the Seoul PB website on a year-by-year basis for 2012-
2015. The data include the proposals submitted by the districts for the final vote in the 
last stage of the PB process (see Table 3.1).3  
 
Table 3.1 
Project Final Status by Year 
 Project final status  
Year 1 (won) 0 (lose) 
Total 
Submitted 
2012 119 106 225 
2013 214 153 367 
2014 346 181 527 
2015 518 581 1,099 
Total 1,197 1,021 2,218 
 
The unit of analysis is a project, and the data consist of 2,218 projects submitted 
to the final stage of PB during the entire four years of Seoul PB from 2012 to 2015, 
representing fiscal years 2013-2016. Then the project-level data was merged with the 
district-level data on each district’s financial needs and social and political environment. 
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And Table 3.2 contains detailed measurements and sources of variables used in this 
study.  
 
Table 3.2 
Measurements and Sources of Variables 
Level Construct Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variables 
Project Project 
size 
Amount of funds The amount of funds received 
for the project. 
Seoul 
PB 
website 
(2012-
2015) 
 
Project 
final status 
Project’s final 
status 
1: If the project is finally 
selected 
0: not selected 
Independent variables 
District District’s 
financial 
needs 
Average 
household income 
Each district’s average 
household monthly income. 
Seoul 
Survey 
(2008) 
 
District 
government’s 
fiscal status 
Fiscal self-reliance ratio of each 
district government. The ratio 
was converted to a percentage 
and used in the decimal form.   
 
Seoul 
city data 
center 
(2012-
2015) 
Inclusiven
ess 
Type of PB 
committees 
Type a: PB ordinance does not 
require to install any 
committees. 
Type b: PB ordinance requires 
to install at least one kind of 
sub-committee in addition to a 
PB general committee. 
Type c: PB ordinance 
mandates that local 
government install both 
thematic committees and 
regional committees in 
addition to a PB general 
committee. 
 
Ministry 
of the 
Interior 
(2012-
2015) 
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In the model, setting type A as 
a base, for example, if a 
district has established type B 
committees, the 1st dummy 
was coded 1 and 0 otherwise. 
In the same way, if a district 
has installed type C 
committees, the 2nd dummy 
was coded 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Political 
environ-
ment 
District 
government’s 
head’s affiliated 
party 
1: If the district head’s 
political party affiliation 
matches the city mayor’s party 
affiliation. 
0: Does not match 
The 
websites 
of the 
city of 
Seoul 
and its 
25 
districts 
Citizen pride To what extent the respondent 
is proud of being a citizen of 
Seoul, from 0 (not feeling 
proud at all) to 100 (feeling 
very proud). Each district’s 
average score for each year. 
Seoul 
Survey 
(2011-
2014) 
 
 Social 
environ-
ment 
Civic activity 
participation rate 
The percentage of respondents 
participated in activities 
through civic organizations in 
each district 
Volunteering 
participation rate 
The percentage of respondents 
participated in volunteering in 
each district 
Trust in 
neighbors/stranger
s/public 
organizations 
(each) 
To what extent the respondent 
trust 
neighbors/strangers/public 
organizations (five-level Likert 
scale from 1 (do not trust at 
all) to 5 (trust to a great 
extent)). Each district’s 
average for each year.  
District 
size 
Population Population by the district in 
each year.  
Statistics 
Korea 
(2012-
2015) 
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Project District 
demands 
Project themes (1) childcare and women’s 
issues, (2) construction, 
transportation, and housing, 
(3) culture, (4) economics and 
industries, (5) environment and 
parks, and (6) health and 
welfare. 
Seoul 
PB 
website 
(2012-
2015) 
 
Dependent Variables 
There are two dependent variables one for each of the two models employed in 
the analysis: 1) project final status (coded binary) and 2) the amount of funds received for 
the project. These two indicators were used to compare the resources that the districts 
received.  
Independent Variables 
District’s Financial Needs. The district’s financial needs are measured by (1) 
district average household monthly income and (2) fiscal self-reliance ratio of the district 
government. The average household monthly income data come from a Seoul survey 
taken in 2008. Seoul city conducts a basic demographic survey every year with a sample 
of 20,000 households. Based on the survey data, the city published the district’s average 
household monthly income in 2008. Since this study’s focus is on the “rank” of the 
districts regarding their poverty, this data was used with an assumption that the trend in 
the districts’ poverty levels would not have dramatically changed throughout the years. 
However, district average household income is constant throughout the years in the 
model due to the data availability. To supplement the analysis, the fiscal self-reliance 
ratio of the districts was also considered.  
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The fiscal self-reliance ratio is used to determine a district’s financial status 
because of 1) the way it is calculated that could serve as a proxy for household wealth in 
a district, 2) the district governments’ roles in the PB process, and 3) data availability. 
First, fiscal self-reliance ratio of a local government is a proxy for the residents’ level of 
income and wealth as it is calculated by “(local tax + non-tax receipts)/local government 
budget.” In other words, a fiscal self-reliance ratio shows the capacity of a local 
government to fully operate its planned budget relying solely on its own revenue sources. 
Since most local tax collections are based on the income of residents and the properties 
located within the area, having more wealthy people and corporations located in the area 
increases the probability of tax revenue collection, which in turn increases the fiscal self-
reliance ratio. Second, the district governments play critical roles in the PB process. The 
district governments are empowered by the law to initiate, manage, and monitor the PB 
process. This means that the funds allocated to the winning projects are added to the 
district government’s budget. Districts often suffer from a fiscal deficit, so the city PB 
process is a good opportunity for them to obtain more additional funds from the city. 
Finally, the fiscal self-reliance ratio of the 25 districts in Seoul is available for all four 
years of the study period from 2012 to 2015. Therefore, using the fiscal self-reliance ratio 
adds more variation to the data analysis compared to using only the district average 
household income.  
Inclusiveness.  Since an inclusive process refers to the process which provides 
various structural avenues for participation, the districts were categorized based on their 
PB structural avenues for participation, which are the type of committees. PB process 
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structures are categorized based on the type of PB committees that are required by the 
district’s PB ordinances (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 for more detail).  
It is posited that compared to type A, installments of types B and C committees 
relatively signify a more “inclusive” participatory process because a district can bring 
more people to the PB process by installing diverse committees rather than having no 
committee or just a general committee. The PB ordinance serves as a proxy to measure 
the committee installation status because district council has to revise the ordinance if the 
district wants to install different kinds of committees.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Type of PB committees  
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Political environment. The district government head’s affiliated party is one of 
the control variables drawn from the PB literature. A political leader from a Left-wing 
party tends to be more open to public participation in the decision-making process (Um & 
Yoon, 2013). Since PB creates the governance arena for the different levels of institutions 
such as city government and sub-city level governments, it is critical to take the 
alignment of political parties of those leaders into consideration. This is because 1) a 
district head from the same party as the City Mayor might try to comply more actively 
with the city’s policy programs, and 2) although not officially allowed, the City Mayor 
could try to make the process more favorable to the districts with government heads from 
the same party. In this regard, I considered whether the district head’s political party 
affiliation matches the current mayor’s party affiliation. Seoul city’s mayor during the 
study period (2012-2015) actively argued for adopting PB and initiated the process, and 
his political party affiliation is center-left.  
I also included citizen identity and pride. National identity and pride have often 
been considered as showing support for the political community (Norris, 1999). Having 
more people that are supportive of the political community in a district could increase the 
probability of having a higher rate of active citizen involvement and participation.  
Social Environment. Social capital and social trust are also important factors that 
affect public participation (Jennings & Stoker, 2004; Putnam, 2001). Scholars have 
pointed out that well-developed civil society is one of the most important conditions to 
adopting PB and helping it take root in society (Avritzer, 2006; Kwak, 2007; UN-Habitat, 
2007). Civil society works as one of the main factors in PB with local governments (UN-
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Habitat, 2007). Sustainably high levels of participation in Porto Alegre, Brazil was 
possible because of an existing tradition of neighborhood associations (Avritzer, 2006; 
Wampler & Avritzer, 2004). Even in cities without strong civic society traditions, civic 
organizations can actively lead the PB process (Ahn & Choi, 2009; Um & Yoon, 2013). 
Residents are likely to be more engaged by participating in the civic activities initiated by 
local civic organizations. In this regard, I included the number of residents engaged in 
civic activities and volunteering to measure the citizenry’s interest in PB (Um & Yoon, 
2013).  
Moreover, social trust as measured by trust in neighbors, in strangers, and in 
public organizations is an important issue in public administration. It is well known that 
PB helps restore trust in government (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012; Goldfrank, 2007), and it 
takes time to build trust even among the participants in the PB process (Pinnington, 
Lerner, & Schugurensky, 2009). It is still not known to what extent the preexisting social 
trust affects PB outcomes. When there are higher levels of trust between neighbors, 
strangers, and public organizations in a district, the PB process could be more easily 
facilitated than the others with lower levels of trust.  
Other Controls. District size, district demand, and project size were also 
controlled, as those are also possible factors that affect funding allocation outcomes for 
PB. First, the population was included to control the size of each district. The number of 
proposals is very likely related to the size of the area because a greater number of people 
would possibly increase demand. Therefore, it is possible that the more populated district 
may submit more projects and thus have more projects selected in the end.  
 41 
Second, district demand was also controlled in the analysis as some districts with 
higher demand might simply win more projects and more funds. District demands were 
measured by project themes, which indicate that what categories of the project are needed 
in each district as some area might be underdeveloped with respect to a certain theme. 
Under ideal conditions, those projects that are most desired or demanded should be 
selected through the deliberation process. Thus I use project themes to reflect the demand 
of the districts (Marquetti, 2009). In this regard, poor districts that lack basic facilities 
may propose more projects related to infrastructure than rich districts and therefore win 
more projects related to its demands. Furthermore, project themes are very likely to affect 
the decisions of people voting in the final stage of PB, as some might consider a certain 
theme is more necessary and critical than other themes. There are six categories, each 
project belongs to one category according to its theme: (1) childcare and women’s issues, 
(2) construction, transportation, and housing, (3) culture, (4) economics and industries, 
(5) environment and parks, and (6) health and welfare. 
Third, project size was included in the first model because this might also affect 
the funding allocation outcomes of PB.5 Related to the project themes, some projects 
might cost more than others due to their nature. For example, the projects proposing to 
build infrastructure may require more funds due to the characteristics of the project itself. 
I measured project size by the amount of funds received for each project in US thousands 
of dollars.6 
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Model Specifications 
This study employs multilevel mixed effects models to capture both the project-
level and district-level effects on the resource allocation. Specifically, the first model 
looks at how many projects each district has won in the city-level PB during the last four 
years (2012-2015). However, looking at the number of winning projects is necessary but 
not sufficient because the amount of funds varies for each project. Therefore, the actual 
amount of funds requested for a project serves as the dependent variable in the second 
model. In the second model, the amount of funds for the projects that did not pass the 
final stage are included as zeros. The raw data range from zero to 2,100 in thousands of 
USD, but this variable was included with a log transformation in the second model for us 
to 1) compare the approximate percentage change in the amount of funds received for a 
one-unit increase in the independent variables and 2) mitigate possible distribution biases. 
After taking a log transformation, the distribution of the residuals in the model is closer to 
normality than before (see Appendix B, C, and D). 
Multi-level analysis is appropriate for this study for three reasons. First, decisions 
are made at the project level. In other words, each project proposal is evaluated and voted 
to be selected throughout the PB process, and each project has its targeted location 
(district). Therefore, project-level characteristics and whether each project was selected 
should not be neglected. District-level characteristics, however, also affect projects 
proposed for/in its districts in various ways. In this regard, it is assumed that projects are 
“nested” in their particular districts. Multi-level analysis is useful when each level can be 
potentially considered as a source of unexplained variability (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
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Finally, simply using the district as the unit of analysis is not sufficient to explain the 
dynamics of PB process on the results, because of an insufficient number of cases. There 
are 25 districts in Seoul, and it has been four years since the city first implemented PB. 
Therefore, there would be 100 observations in total (4 times repeated observations on 25 
samples), which reduces the power and ultimately the generalizability of the statistical 
analysis. 
According to the type of dependent variables of each model, I test the first model 
with multi-level logistic regression analysis and the second model is tested with multi-
level normal regression analysis (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008).  
Model 1 
𝑌 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀  
Model 2 
 𝑌 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 ×
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀  
The dependent variable, Y is 1) project status in Model 1 and 2) amount of funds 
requested for a project in Model 2. Needs refer to financial needs, which are measured by 
1) district’s average household income and 2) fiscal self-reliance ratio of the district 
government, and Inclusiveness are measured by the type of PB committees. Political and 
Social environments are included in the model in addition to other controls, which 
include project size (only in the Model 1), district size, and district demands (project 
themes). 𝜀 represents random error term or unobserved determinants of Y. 
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Empirical Results 
Model 1 explores the factors that explain the likelihood of a project getting 
selected in the final stage of PB (Table 3.3), whereas Model 2 explores the factors that 
explain the amount of funds received (logged) for a winning project in the final stage of 
PB (Table 3.4). Table 3.5 presents a comparison of the estimated amount of funds 
allocated to different types of PB committees for the lowest- and highest-income districts; 
this is an interpretation of the interaction variables of average household income and 
types of PB committees I included in the Model 2. 
As shown in Table 3.3, according to the results of the logistic regression model 
(Model 1), the odds of being selected in the final stage for a project in a district with a 
higher level of average household income is approximately 77% lower than the odds of 
being selected for a project in a district with lower average household income. Another 
measure of districts’ financial needs, the district office’s fiscal self-reliance ratios, 
appears not to be statistically significant.  
Model 2 results are presented in Table 3.4. In the simple linear regression model 
without any interaction variables included, on average and holding all else constant, there 
is approximately 0.9% decrease in the amount of funds received for each one percent 
increase in a district’s average household income. In the model with the interaction 
between average household income and PB committee-type variables included, the extent 
increases to about 1.28%. In other words, on average and holding other variables 
constant, for each one percent increase in district’s average household income, there is 
about 1.28% decrease in the amount per capita of achieved funds for a district.  
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Table 3.3  
Multilevel Logistic Regression Results of Model 1 
Note. * P < .10, ** P < .05, *** P < .001 
 
    Odds 
ratio 
Std. 
Err. 
District’s financial needs Average household income 
(log) 
.230** .006 
 Fiscal self-reliance ratio .998 .135 
Type of PB committees  
(Base: Type A) 
Type B 1.355* .214 
  Type C 1.179 .202 
Political environment Party affiliation matches 
between the district govt. 
heads and the city mayor 
1.076 .191 
 Pride as a Seoul citizen 1.060** .022 
Participation Civic activities 1.246** .137 
  Volunteering 1.024** .011 
Social trust  Neighbors .606 .292 
  Strangers .948 .397 
  Public organizations 1.114 .419 
District size Population (log) .944 .205 
    
Project themes  
 (Base: childcare & women’s 
issues) 
  
  
  
Construction, transportation,  
& housing 
1.397** .234 
Culture 1.020 .188 
Economics & industries 1.435** .261 
Environment & parks 1.226 .204 
Health and welfare 1.002 .183 
Project size Project fund (log) .946 .036 
    
Year 2013 1.130 .221 
  2014 1.258 .322 
  2015 .844 .409 
_cons   .342 1.116 
    
  
District: Identity  sd (_cons) .035** .027 
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Table 3.4 
Multilevel Regression Results of Model 2 
Dependent Variable:  
Amount of funds for a project 
No interactions Interactions (average 
hh income x PB 
committees) 
    Coef. Robust  
Std. Err. 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
District’s 
financial needs 
Average household 
(hh) income (log) 
-.915* .553 -1.280** .457 
 Fiscal self-reliance 
ratio 
-.001 .007 -.002 .006 
Type of PB 
committees 
Type B .218** .102 -.938** .411 
  Type C .169 .127 .476 1.303 
Average 
household 
income x PB 
committees    
Average hh income x  
Type B committees 
  1.150** .393 
 Average hh income x  
Type C committees 
  -.372 1.417 
Political 
environment 
Party affiliation 
matches between the 
district govt. heads 
and the city mayor 
.088 .136 .179 .121 
 Pride as a Seoul 
citizen 
.026 .020 .028 .019 
Participation Civic activities .116 .086 .136* .082 
  Volunteering .010 .009 .006 .008 
Social trust  Neighbors -.204 .527 -.195 .507 
  Strangers -.004 .364 .075 .274 
  Public organizations -.066 .280 -.051 .350 
District size Population (log) -.177 .181 -.173 .148 
      
Project themes 
 (Base: childcare  
& women’s 
issues) 
 
  
Construction, 
transportation,  
& housing 
.278** .101 .288** .101 
Culture -.034 .105 -.030 .105 
Economics & 
industries 
.242** .099 .248** .099 
Environment & parks .290*** .069 .303*** .070 
Health and welfare -.049 .080 -.041 .080 
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Note. * P < .10, ** P < .05, *** P < .001 
 
Compared to the type A districts regarding PB committee requirements, the type 
B districts won more funds. The type B districts that are required to install PB general 
committee and at least one kind of subcommittees won about 22% more than the type A 
districts, which have no requirements regarding PB committee installation or that need to 
install only a PB general committee. Even if we compare the districts with the same level 
of average household income, the districts which have to install a PB general committee 
and one kind of sub-committees (type B) won about 1.15% more funds than the type A 
districts, on average and holding other variables constant. 
I added an interaction term to the model to test whether the fund allocation results 
differed by average household income and by type of PB committees of a district. For the 
type B districts, a 1% increase in average household income would yield about 0.13% 
decrease in the amount of funds received. In addition, for the type A districts, a 1% 
increase in average household income would yield about 1.28% decrease in the amount 
of funds received.  
Table 3.5 presents the amount of funds calculated based on the interactions of the 
type of committees and the lowest and highest levels of average household income.  
      
Year 2013 -.013 .214 -.160 .209 
  2014 -.300 .262 -.349 .249 
  2015 -.606 .399 -.617 .392 
_cons   5.423* 3.278 5.358* 2.974 
        
District: Identity  sd (_cons) .142** .041 .111** .047 
 sd (Residual) 1.229 .025 1.229** .025 
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When comparing the districts with the lowest and highest levels of average 
household income, type B districts consistently won more funds than type A districts. 
Furthermore, the lowest-income district won more funds than the highest-income district 
regardless of the type of PB committee. It is interesting to note that the differences in the 
amount of funds won between different type of PB committees are much greater among 
the highest-income districts ($2,840) than that of the lowest-income districts ($1,056). 
This implies that for the highest-income districts, being inclusive is more important than 
in lowest-income districts with respect to winning more funds.  
 
Table 3.5 
Comparison of the Amount of Funds between Type of PB Committee and the Lowest- and 
Highest-Income Districts 
 
  
Average household income 
 
  The lowest-
income district 
The highest-
income district 
Differences in 
the income level 
Type of PB 
committee 
Type A  2,778 
 (USD) 
241 2,537 
Type B  3,834 3,081 753 
Differences in the  
type of PB committees 
1,056 2,840  
Note. Amount of funds for the winning projects in USD 
 
The rate of participation in civic activities is positively related to the amount of 
funds received. On average and holding all else constant, for each one percent increase in 
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the district’s average civic activities participation rate, there is about 13.6 percent 
increase in the amount of winning funds.  
While pride as a Seoul citizen and volunteer rate appears statistically significant 
in Model 1, they are not significant in Model 2. In addition, political party affiliation 
matches between the head of district government and the city mayor and social trust 
variables (trust in neighbors, strangers, and public organizations) are not statistically 
significant either. 
Discussions 
The results of this study offer several interesting issues. First, the results indicate 
that a poorer district has a higher probability of winning a project and is rewarded more 
funds compared to its wealthier counterparts. These results suggest that, even without 
explicit criteria on equity in the Seoul PB process, the funding allocations have 
redistributed resources to the poor.  
Second, inclusiveness, which was measured by the types of PB committees 
required to be installed for each district, is another important factor that explains the 
probability of being selected in the final stage for a project and the amount of funds 
allocated to a district. Compared to the type A districts, which do not have to install any 
PB committees or have only one general PB committee, the type B districts that are 
required to install a general PB committee and one kind of sub-committee (either 
thematic or regional) have been awarded more projects and funds. It is interesting to note 
that type C districts were not statistically significant in either model analysis. Considering 
that type C districts are required to install both thematic and regional sub-committees in 
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addition to a general PB committee, I suggest that there is a peak-point at which the 
degree of inclusiveness positively affects the financial allocation results of PB.  
Third, an interaction term to Model 2 was included to test whether the relationship 
between the amount of funds received for a project on the district’s average household 
income differed by the district’s type of PB committees. The model predicted that the 
lowest average household income district with type B PB committees (general PB 
committee and one sub-committee) won the most among the four possible cases (see 
Table 3.5). This suggests that a district’s financial needs and type of PB committees are 
both important to consider together. It is interesting to note that the differences in the 
amounts of funds between different type of PB committees are much greater among the 
highest-income districts than that of the lowest-income districts. As installing either 
thematic or regional committee enables the district government to hear the residents’ 
voices more directly and effectively, ultimately the government would better reflect the 
resident’s demands and needs. The wealthiest districts might benefit more from having a 
more inclusive PB design because they could create a niche by listening to residents 
when there are comparatively sufficient resources available in the community.  
Fourth, in the analysis political and social environment displayed some different 
effects on the odds of winning a project and the amount of funds received. While pride as 
a Seoul citizen, civic participation, and volunteer rate were positively related to the odds 
of winning a project, only civic participation was positively associated with the amount 
of funds received. It means that having more residents being proud of living in Seoul, 
participating in civic activities and volunteerism increases the chance of winning more 
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projects. And among those, higher civic participation rate leads to more funds for a 
district. It is important to note that, however, the information used in the study are district 
average measures, not average measures of the PB participants. As such, the measures 
suggest indirect rather than direct effects of civic participation and volunteer rate on the 
communities’ other participation processes, which in this case is PB.  
 
Conclusion 
This study’s results show that in the case of Seoul PB, even without the presence 
of equity criteria, poor districts won more projects and funds compared to rich districts. 
This finding confirms the argument that social justice outcomes such as redistribution are 
possible even without the presence of explicit criteria on equity (Fung, 2015). The 
findings indicate that redistribution is possible because of the way the PB structure is 
designed (i.e., the inclusion of different configurations of subcommittees). The second 
model predicted that the lowest average household income district with type B PB 
committees (general PB committee and one sub-committee) won the most among the four 
possible cases. In addition, the inclusiveness of the PB process was partially associated 
with the amount of funds awarded to the winning projects: districts that have at least one 
sub-committee in addition to a general PB committee won more projects and funds 
compared to those that have no committee or only a general PB committee.  
Two findings from this paper suggest interesting avenues for future research. 
First, the relationship of inclusiveness and PB funding allocation was not simply linear. 
In other words, type C districts that are required to install both thematic and regional sub-
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committees in addition to a general PB committee showed no statistical difference from 
type A districts. This finding might imply that there is a certain threshold before which 
the extent of inclusiveness positively leads to more projects and funds. Installing and 
operating all different types of committees may increase transactional costs for the 
district government, and this, in turn, may generate inefficiencies. Hence, it is pertinent to 
interrogate this result to interrogate this result with additional measures of inclusiveness. 
Second, the difference in the amount of funds between the types of PB committee 
appeared greater within the district with the highest level of average income than that of 
the districts with the lowest level of average income. Simply put, the wealthiest districts 
benefit more than the poorest district from installing one more sub-committee in addition 
to a general committee (changing from type A committee to type B committee). It would 
be interesting to study how the various type of PB committee work differently in different 
social, economic, and environmental settings. 
There are three limitations of this study. First, due to the data availability, the 
average household income from a panel survey in one year was used. Since there is no 
publicly available data on the exact average household income for each district, I 
considered the fiscal status of the district government office for financial needs of the 
district. Second, a set of district characteristic variables such as participation in civic 
activities and volunteering, social trust, and pride as a citizen are adopted from a panel 
survey. Although this study used each district’s average information as a proxy that 
affects the overall atmosphere of the society within each district, a direct measure of the 
PB participants could enhance the accuracy of the analysis. Third, the type of PB 
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committee is measured based on the content of districts’ PB ordinances, not the actual 
practice. Although taking the ordinances into the consideration is a good proxy because 
districts need to first establish the ordinance, to newly install any different kind of 
committee, there might be a case in which the committees are not implemented in 
practice.  
Despite the limitations, the findings of this study make several contributions to 
the fields of participatory governance and civic engagement. First, civic participation in 
the decision-making process is often considered an essential mechanism for increasing 
accountability and social justice. This study offers empirical evidence to show that civic 
participation leads to the greater achievement of social justice. Second, this study 
employs multi-level mixed-effects analysis to account for both project-level and district-
level determinants. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to look at the PB 
distribution outcomes by considering both project-level and district-level characteristics 
with the assumption of the nested structure of the relationship between projects and 
district. Third, I examined how the inclusiveness of the process itself influences the 
outcomes of PB. The findings suggest that having more inclusive processes to encourage 
citizen participation helps gain more resources than others with less inclusive processes. 
Furthermore, the findings in the case of Seoul PB show that redistributive effects appear 
differently in districts with different levels of average household income and district’s 
type of PB committees. Operating an ‘inclusive’ participatory process is even more 
important for districts with a higher level of average household income. The differences 
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in the amount of funds won between different type of PB committees are much greater 
among the highest-income districts than that of the lowest-income districts. 
Notes 
1. Two hundred and fifty delegates are equally drawn from those who applied, regarding 
age, gender, and districts.   
2. Source: http://yesan.seoul.go.kr (in Korean). 
3. On the one hand, it means that the residents have been actively participating over the 
years since it was first introduced. On the other hand, since there is a ceiling that each 
district can submit to the city-level PB, the city PB committee tends to prioritize small 
(less costly) projects rather than large (more costly) projects. 
4. Project size, which is measured by the amount of funds is a control variable in the first 
model only. This variable is the dependent variable in the second model. 
5. Converted in the ratio of one US Dollar (USD) = 1,200 Korean Won (KRW). 
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Chapter 4 
UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES: EXPLORING HOW CITIZENS MAKE 
DECISIONS IN PARTICIPATORY MEETINGS 
Along with the recognition of the value of public participation in the government 
decision-making process (Fung, 2006; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Yang & Pandey, 2011), 
both scholars and practitioners have explored the question of how to design participation 
processes to achieve expected outcomes to a great extent (Bryson, Quick, Slotterback, & 
Crosby, 2012; Nabatchi, 2012; Wright & Street, 2007). Since the design is one of the 
critical components of planning in terms of shaping the process and producing desirable 
outcomes, the very first stage in design guidelines for public participation is identifying 
purposes and assessing the context (Bryson et al., 2012).  
Scholars have evaluated various cases of public participation practices in terms of 
its goal and design. For example, PB in Porto Alegre, Brazil was designed “pro-poor,” 
because the goal was to achieve a social justice outcome such as redistribution (Fung, 
2015; Marquetti et al., 2012; Wampler, 2000). In this case, participants followed the 
designed process accordingly so that the PB initiative was able to achieve their desired 
outcomes. Not all cases, however, can achieve the outcomes as intended. The previous 
chapter provided empirical evidence that achieving social justice outcome—
redistribution—is possible even without any explicit criteria on equity embedded in the 
process. Having unexpected consequences are not always negative, but would have been 
better for the managers if they could have predicted and managed the process 
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accordingly, and understanding how participants behave in the participatory meetings 
would be essential.  
The literature on PB suggests that social justice outcomes may be achieved, even 
when not intended if the process has been designed and implemented in pursuit of 
legitimacy and effectiveness of governance (Fung, 2015). By involving ordinary citizens, 
it is expected that the decisions will better reflect the demands of the people since the 
procedures are determined by those most affected by the process (Fung & Wright, 2003). 
This means that it is pertinent to study how the participants make decisions in the PB 
processes. This study tries to reveal what happened behind the scene by analyzing the 
interviews conducted with active participants in PB.  
This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section reviews the 
literature and introduces the research setting, the PB process of Seoul, South Korea. The 
second section presents the data and the methods, and then the third section reports the 
main research findings and discusses the implications. The last section summarizes the 
conclusions, provides the summary of the results, and discusses the limitations and 
contributions of the study. 
 
Opening the Government: Redistribution of Power and Resources 
The long-standing hesitation of increasing public participation comes from the 
basis of representative democracy because involving the public could mean losing the 
decision-making control. Lawrence and Deagen (2001) suggest that public involvement 
may not be necessary in cases in which the manager is confident that they have sufficient 
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information to make a high-quality decision, and public acceptance is reasonably certain. 
In addition, the tendency of pursuing efficiency in the government decision-making has 
been left either to public managers or with certain groups of people with power. A large 
barrier to public participation can be found in its costs, particularly time and money. It 
has been argued that a well-trained, skilled public manager may make the same decision 
within a shorter period of time than the public would choose at the end of the process of 
involvement (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). Even when the government tries to open up their 
decision-making process, due to the costs involved in reaching out to the broader public, 
the participatory process could simply end up with including those stakeholders who are 
deeply related to the issue or are politically, economically, or socially privileged, still 
keeping the process efficient and also merely satisfying the goal. 
Considering the principle of public participation, allowing the public to 
participate in the government decision-making process means that the government gives 
back the delegated power to the ones who originally owned it. Arnstein (1969) contends 
that citizen participation is “a categorical term for citizen power,” (p. 216)—the means by 
which the traditionally underrepresented groups can also be involved. In this regard, 
reducing participation bias through either random selection or targeted demographic 
recruitment is critical (Nabatchi, 2012). In addition, it is important to share decision-
making authority because if participants realize they have participated in the process 
which would not be implemented, they could easily lose faith in government (Smith & 
Mcdonough, 2001). The different levels of shared authority in various participatory 
processes are well described in the International Association for Public Participation 
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(IAP2) Spectrum of Public Participation, with five levels ranging from information to 
empowerment (see Figure 4.1).  
Moreover, “shifting power to those who are socially and politically 
marginalized,” (Fung, 2015, p. 519) can contribute to advancing three values of 
democratic governance: legitimacy, effectiveness, and social justice (Corburn, 2003; 
Fung, 2015). Bryson et al. (Bryson et al., 2012), in their synthesized guidelines for 
designing public participation, suggest to recruit diverse stakeholders and enable diverse 
participation by 1) providing multiple ways to participate, 2) providing supplementary 
services such as language translation or child care, and 3) ensuring meeting locations and 
time accessible, if the public participation aims at advancing social justice (i.e., 
improving equity in distributing public services). This means that diverse participation 
would lead to advanced social justice as an outcome. This is possible when participatory 
processes gather views from previously excluded groups and deliver public goods and 
services to those who are disadvantaged (Corburn, 2003). They are more likely to gather 
local knowledge, which will recognize the current status of inequitable distribution 
(Corburn, 2003), and therefore contribute to the indirect achievement of social justice 
(Fung, 2015). 
Furthermore, participatory processes need to have specific procedures and rules in 
order to yield the desired outcome. One of the stages required in designing public 
participation consists of the creation of rules and structures to guide the process. Indeed, 
rules about managing the process and making decisions connect participatory processes 
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and organizational structures (Bryson et al., 2012). For example, participatory processes 
 
Figure 4.1. The modified spectrum of public participation with communication modes. 
Adapted from Nabatchi (2012). 
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may consult citizens without any established initiatives, collaborate with citizens, or 
empower them by installing various types of committees such as regional or thematic 
committees, and incorporate the recommendations from the citizens into the decisions 
(Yoon & Lim, 2016). In other words, the organizational structures will reflect the purpose 
of the participatory processes and the level of shared authority. There is extensive 
literature on how people make decisions in different settings. There is still a dearth of 
empirical evidence, however, on how PB participants make decisions within a certain set 
of rules provided. This is the focus of this chapter.   
 
The Research Setting 
The city government of Seoul has designed PB with several layers of participatory 
components in order to better reflect citizens’ opinions. First, the 25 districts in the city 
were included as the regional committees in the city-level PB. It was expected that the 
district governments facilitate the regional committee meetings so that they refine the 
residents’ needs and ideas, and submit the proposals to the city-level PB. Second, the city 
runs several thematic committees, and the city PB committee members review and score 
the proposals. In 2016, there were nine thematic committees: 1) Transportation & 
housing, 2) Urban safety, 3) Culture & tourism, 4) Welfare, 5) Women & health, 6) Job 
opportunities, 7) Youth, 8) Environment & parks, and 9) Teenagers. Third, any residents 
in the city (including the committee members) can vote on the proposals submitted to the 
final stage.    
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The 25 autonomous districts have a head directly elected by the residents, have 
their own revenue from local taxes such as property taxes and non-tax receipt, and 
operate their own budget. Almost all districts, however, are not 100% financially 
independent, so that have to rely on grants-in-aid from the government of higher-level 
(either Seoul city government or the national government) to fully operate their budget. 
Since Seoul PB includes the 25 districts as its regional committees in the city-level PB 
and districts are in charge of implementing the winning projects, PB became an 
additional revenue source for the districts.  
The process can be briefed as follows. First, any resident in the city can submit 
project ideas and proposals directly to the city or their district. The city officials review 
the proposals first, but at this stage, city officials only serve to filter whether there are any 
legal or practical issues involved. In particular, the city officials leave a note on the 
projects which overlap with the city’s planned policy programs in the near future. 
Second, in the PB thematic committees based on the project themes, the proposals are 
reviewed, scored, and filtered so that each proposal is decided whether it would be sent to 
the final stage of PB. In 2016, there were 38 PB thematic meetings–from 2 to 5 meetings 
per each thematic committee–held during the summer (June to August) in 2016. Ordinary 
citizens and committee members vote on the projects brought to the general meeting in 
the final stage. In the very final step, the city council approves the winning projects 
unless the council finds one disqualified.  
The PB committee members, who review, score, and filter proposals, are also 
ordinary citizens who volunteer to participate actively. To become a committee member, 
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any resident who 1) has an address, 2) works, and/or 3) are enrolled in an elementary-, 
middle-, high-school, college, or university in the city of Seoul can first apply. The city 
government randomly draws 250 people out of those applied people with a consideration 
of balancing them in terms of gender, age, and location. As a result, the committees are 
comprised of about 10 members each from 25 districts in Seoul. The members can 
continue if they wish to, to serve as a committee member for two years in a row in 
maximum.  
The PB committee members are required to review and score each proposal. The 
members choose, based on their interest, one out of nine PB thematic committees to 
participate. The city managers who are in charge of managing PB are supposed to 
distribute the proposals book to the committee members in advance of thematic meetings 
to allow them to review the proposals beforehand. The committee members use the 
evaluation form with eight evaluation criteria prepared by the city government to score 
each proposal: 1) needs, 2) urgency, 3) publicness, 4) effectiveness, 5) accomplishment, 
6) subject fit, 7) gender equality, and 8) project cost appropriateness (see Table 4.1). The 
aggregated score from the committee members is considered in each thematic committee 
to decide whether to pass a project to the next level or not.      
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Table 4.1 
Seoul PB Thematic Committee Proposal Evaluation Form 
Project No. ___________    Project title: 
______________________________________ 
Item Indicator 
Disagree … Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
Need Is this project, with regard to the purpose 
and impact of PB, really necessary? 
     
Urgency Is this project urgent and needs to be 
implemented immediately?  
     
Publicness Do you think this project benefit a majority 
of the residents? 
     
Effectiveness Is there a valid ground for this project’s 
plan? 
     
Accomplishment Can this project be done within the proposed 
time? 
     
Subject fit Is this project appropriate with regard to the 
overall theme of PB?  
     
Gender Equality Is this project helpful in improving gender 
equality? 
     
Project cost 
appropriateness 
Is this project’s cost appropriate in terms of 
its purpose? 
     
TOTAL  
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Data and Methods 
Data  
This study uses the in-depth interviews with 28 PB committee members, who 
participated in Seoul PB in 2016, to answer the research question. Committee members 
are active and critical participants because they, as budget delegates, review and score 
proposals submitted to the PB and cast votes in the final stage of PB with other citizens.  
Since there is no contact list available regarding the members’ privacy protection, 
I went to the committee meetings and met the committee members. I explained the 
purpose of the study, asked whether they are interested in participating, and gained their 
contact information. Since the meetings were held in the late evening, the interviews had 
to be arranged at a different time and place. I contacted those who gave their contact 
information within 1-2 days and met them individually at their best convenient time and 
place. The interviews were conducted in July-August 2016 and each interview took about 
30 minutes. Among the 36 committee members who gave me their contacts, 28 finally 
participated in the interviews.  
Table 4.2 presents the characteristics of interviewees. The age of the 28 
committee members ranged from 17 to 67 years old, and the modal age group was 40-49. 
A little more than half of the interviewees (53.6%) had a bachelor’s degree. Most 
reported being first-time participating in the Seoul PB committee, but about 36% have 
continued to serve as committee members since the previous year. More females (57.1%) 
than males (42.9%) participated, and people from the Women & Health committee 
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participated in the interview the most, followed by the Job opportunities committee. 
Among the participants, 17.9% were serving as chairs in their thematic committees.  
 
Table 4.2 
Characteristics of PB Committee Members Interviewed 
Characteristic 
% 
(N=28) 
Characteristic 
% 
(N=28) 
Age  Term  
Under 20  10.7 First 64.3 
20-29 17.9 Second 35.7 
30-39 10.7 Gender  
40-49 32.1 Female 57.1 
50-59 17.9 Male 42.9 
60 or over 10.7 Thematic committee  
Education  Transportation & housing 7.1 
Current high school students  14.3 Welfare 14.3 
High school graduate 3.6 Women & health 25.0 
2-year college graduate 7.1 Job opportunities 21.4 
Current 4-year university 
students 
10.7 
Teenagers 14.3 
Bachelor’s degree 53.6 Environment & parks 17.9 
Master’s degree 14.3 Committee chairs 17.9 
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Methods 
The interviews were audio-recorded with participants’ consent. All the interviews 
were conducted in Korean because it is the national and official language. After the 
interviews, the related parts of the audio-recorded interview were transcribed and 
translated into English for the purpose of analysis.  
Interview transcripts and notes were analyzed following the process presented in 
the “Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data” by Rubin & Rubin (2005). First, 
interviewing and transcribing processes were already a part of the analysis because while 
conducting and listening to the interviews, I gained an idea of the most important 
concepts and themes. 
The first stage of the analysis was finding the concepts, themes, and topical 
markers in the interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). The most important part of the 
interview I focused on is the response to the question “What criteria did you personally 
use to decide which proposals to score high in the city thematic committees?” In addition, 
participants could also talk about how the decisions are made while answering the 
question “What do you think about the PB process in general? What are the positive and 
negative aspects?” I looked for the terms such as “scoring/reviewing/filtering proposals,” 
“votes,” and “criteria,” and found the summary statements which include explanations of 
how the funding allocation decisions are made. The second stage consisted of 
understanding and clarifying what is meant by specific concepts and themes (Rubin & 
Rubin, 2005). In this stage, I synthesized different versions of explanations and then 
elaborated and integrated the concepts and themes.  
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In the next stage, I coded the data to examine the interviews. Coding categories 
include “criteria used for scoring proposals” and “descriptions of scoring and decision-
making processes.” The types of criteria that are used for scoring proposals were 
discovered while exploring the interview data and will be presented in the findings 
section. After coding the interviews, I synthesized the concepts and themes to conclude 
from information in the interviews that process by which the committee members made 
decisions and what were the main dynamics that drove the outcomes redistributive. 
 
Findings and Discussions 
Scoring Criteria 
Not following the formal evaluation criteria. Even though there was a formal 
evaluation form with eight criteria (Table 4.1), participants reported that they did not 
fully used the evaluation items but rather used their own criteria for several reasons.  
First, some committee members described their concerns regarding the evaluation 
criteria: 
I wasn’t sure what the gender equality criterion was about… Maybe it is 
because I am a man, but it was kind of difficult for me to think from women’s 
perspectives… I thought… Gender equality is really difficult (Participant #18). 
I think overall, the evaluation criteria are good. But, to look at it more 
specifically, for example, gender equality, it is perceived as trying to give benefits 
to men and women half and half ... but this needs more training… (…) it is not 
trying to make numerically 50:50 (Participant #3). 
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For example, when the proposal is about a dog park, you know, there is a 
criterion related to gender equality… a pet dog and gender equality have nothing 
to do with each other but if I try to fit that criteria to this proposal then this one 
would get 0 points. So sometimes it is different by themes and subjects but trying 
to fit this one to all didn’t make sense to me (Participant #6). 
I think they are all in need, they are all necessary (Participant #12).  
 
Second, participants had different views on the items. For example, gender 
equality was often described as ambiguous one. One member of the environmental & 
parks committee expressed difficulty in considering gender equality, and another member 
of the women & health committee argued that gender equality needs to be more carefully 
educated to the committee members. The other participant in the women & health 
committee found that the gender equality item is sometimes not applicable to certain 
types of projects, depending on its themes or subjects. In addition, there was one 
participant who expressed her doubt on the usefulness of the ‘needs’ item because she felt 
all proposed projects are in need.  
In this regard, committee members revealed that they scored the proposals 
regardless of the given criteria. In some cases, they marked “5” for all items and gave the 
full points (total 40) to the proposals they wanted to be selected, while checked “1” for all 
items to the proposals they did not want to be selected:   
 
 69 
When a proposer from Gangnam-gu starts to come out to the floor to 
present, people were already marking on “1”s (Participant #22). 
I might have given some pluses to our districts; if the total 50 was 
possible, I could have given 50 (Participant #12).  
There is a table of criteria. But these are somewhat difficult and does not 
come to my mind right away. I have my own criteria. (Participant #6).  
 
A committee member shared what he has seen in the meetings since Gangnam-gu 
is well known as one of the wealthiest districts in Seoul, committee members gave the 
lowest score to the proposal submitted by someone from the high-income neighborhoods 
regardless of the project’s quality or content. In addition, other participants responded 
that they would have given the highest score possible to a proposal or use her own 
criteria. This means that committee members have evaluated the proposals in their own 
ways, rather than following the items given in the evaluation form.  
Needs as the most important criterion. In this regard, the participants were 
asked what criterion, either from the evaluation form or their own, they considered the 
most important. Most of the participants responded that they consider “needs” as the most 
important criterion (see Table 4.3):  
 
I took a look at whether it is really in need (Participant #9).  
If the residents proposed a brilliant idea, if it is really needed, I put those 
in a priority.  (Participant #4).  
Whether the project is really in need for the residents (Participant #3).  
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When residents find… when they have felt in their daily life, that 
something they really need… as you know, the proposers came and presented 
their proposals, if I can agree with them that it is really needed in our life … 
(Participant #2). 
 
Table 4.3 
The Most Common Criteria Committee Members Used in Proposal Evaluation 
Criterion # % (Total N=28) 
Needs 13 46.4 
Appropriateness (cost) 8 28.6 
The idea is from a resident (not district office) 7 25.0 
The idea is not overlapping with any city policy 6 21.4 
Effectiveness 4 14.3 
My district 4 14.3 
Equity (redistribution) 4 14.3 
Uniqueness 4 14.3 
 
Related to the necessity, committee members also valued whether the idea/project 
is overlapping with any existing city policy programs. It won’t be “necessary” to be 
selected in PB, if the problem is going to be solved through different mechanisms 
anyways. There were also some participants who looked at the necessity in the districts:  
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I wanted to, I was in… kind of... favor of those districts falling behind 
(Participant #25).  
Since I know that districts differ in their “housekeeping,” I think… um, 
how can I say, it is better to allocate more funds to those districts with low self-
reliance… (Participant #4).  
 
Other than the criteria listed in Table 4.3, there were more criteria mentioned. 
Those include whether the project is fair, feasible, safe (10.7% each), makes sense, have 
a component that could engage residents, have benefits to a larger population (7.1% 
each), and not political (3.6%).  
Giving a priority to the districts in need. Even though the city expected the 
committee members to review and evaluate the proposals based on its content and 
quality, committee members often considered the location of the project more than the 
proposal itself.  
 
Since I know that districts differ in their “housekeeping,” I think… um, 
how can I say, it is better to allocate more funds to those districts with low self-
reliance… (Participant #4).  
Well, the demands and the needs differ in districts. There are some 
districts where the basic infrastructure lacks... but there are also other districts not 
interested in PB at all. Seocho-gu, Gangnam-gu, Songpa-gu… These districts not 
only have sufficient budget but also not interested in PB… So I wanted to, I was 
in… kind of... favor of those districts falling behind (Participant #25).  
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Disadvantaged groups participated more actively. Even though they were not 
directly asked to report the differences in participation between those traditionally 
neglected groups and others, participants shared what they have seen regarding the 
differences while answering to the question related to the process.  
 
The degree of participation of those from high-income districts is low, and 
those from low-income districts participate actively… And we (low-income 
district) almost beg for projects and funds. Sir, you know our district… We are 
always in top 5 of any kind of bad indexes like serious crime rate, […] and we 
always mention it in presentations so now they (other committee members) all 
know (Participant #22). 
Even though women want to speak, you know what? Even if women want 
to speak, in a public meeting, for example, in a residential neighborhood hearing, 
even where it is allowed to debate, mothers or elderly such as over 50 years old, 
don’t or can’t speak in public. It hasn’t been that long for women to have power, 
you know, even it is allowed to debate and speak out, … they just speak in the 
back, like I didn’t like that one, I wanted to do this… But what is funny is that… 
those who have money and power? They tend to dominate the floor. Because to 
speak out, you need some wealth or capacity.  Those who are ordinary, or poor, or 
even the people who fall behind, they don’t have any opportunity to speak. Those 
who are rich are more self-confident, they don’t care about what others say 
because they have money… […] Even though there are many things to be 
improved, I understand that there is always trial and error at the beginning… I 
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wish this PB can be more expanded and facilitated because I really liked that… to 
learn that I could witness the changes. I like that I could contribute to making this 
society better (Participant #16). 
 
Participants have recognized the wealthiest districts’ (e.g., Gangnam-gu, Seocho-
gu, Songpa-gu) lack of interests in PB by seeing that the committee members from those 
districts are not attending the committee meetings. For example, participant 16 was 
concerned that in other participatory mechanisms, those who are ordinary, poor, or falling 
behind (e.g., women, the poor, and elderly) tend not to speak out even if they are 
expected and allowed to. Although she did not agree that PB was doing a really good job 
in making the processes differently such as including more voices from the disadvantaged 
groups, she recognized the positive changes she has had as a mother and as a woman 
after participating in PB.  
One of the reasons why that the participation of those from low-income districts 
was active could be attributed to the support from the district offices.  
 
We meet the proposers in the bus provided by the district office. […] 
District officials call me to check whether I would be attending today’s meeting. I 
always tell them not to worry because I will always go (Participant #22).  
 
I felt that the city office does not really take care of committee members. 
It would be great if they could provide at least some beverages for us volunteering 
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hard in this process. Jungrang-gu district office provided coffee one day 
(Participant #13).  
 
Since the district offices were desperate in winning more projects and funds, the 
districts in those low-income districts provided transportation for the committee members 
and idea proposers in their districts and something to eat or drink for all committee 
members. In addition, district officials even made a call on the day when the meetings 
held to make sure the committee members go to the meetings that they could score in 
favor of their district.  
Please vote for “our district.” Many committee members revealed that they 
were more inclined to be favor of the proposals submitted from/for their own districts or 
reported that there are committee members who voted or scored high for their districts.  
 
Umm… because I live in “OO district,” the proposals from our district 
catch my eyes (Participant #18).   
When I see, oh this is our district’s! I kind of feel that I would like to give 
more (score) to our district’s (proposal), (…) I might have given some pluses to 
our districts because while I was passing by, I saw that oh this is really in need, I 
know it for sure…  (Participant #12). 
People are not mature in terms of civic awareness. They just try to get 
only their districts’ (Participant #16).  
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And there were some districts and committee members from the district teamed 
up together to get higher scores and more votes: 
 
There are about 10 to 15 people from 1 district, but well, I have received 
text messages with proposal ID numbers, saying that this this this one are our 
district’s… please take a look again at these ones, yes, from district offices, it is 
inevitable. Well, I try to be fair, but other committee members also receive those 
text messages or post-it notes. It might not be ethical, but there are too many 
proposals to review… so some people just give up reviewing them all and just 
mark high scores to those proposals (Participant #12). 
This could be an unexpected good effect of some adverse effects, but 
those poor districts united, formed a team to vote for each other. Some might 
think this is a collusion (Participant #23). 
I realized that there were some districts had some kind of agreement 
among them. I could see that after seeing the results from the first round. But 
there was nothing we could do about it (Participant #24). 
 
Some committee members were not only voting for their own districts but also 
voting for other districts when they were asked. And those who formed a team and 
actively advocated and promoted their proposals are those from the low-income districts. 
Although some committee members think it is inevitable or even desirable, others found 
that the intervention of district office makes the process not fair.  
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While participating in PB, what I felt the most was that the competition 
among the districts is really intense. I think the evaluation should be done fairly, 
but as we say that men are blind in their own causes, when district officials 
contact, and I think all the committee members should have received a call from 
their district office, including me, in fact I think we should fairly evaluate the 
proposals on our own terms, but in particular, teenager committee members check 
as they were asked by the public officials. I’ve seen many cases like that 
(Participant #26).  
The district leaders really care about winning more. If the district does not 
win many projects, the district heads push hard the budget team members in their 
organizations. It is easily observed. Making PB as a competition among districts 
is not desirable (Participant #4). 
 
The participants recognized that this PB process is a competition among the 
citizens, which is a kind of power game among them. It is worthwhile to note that the 
participants from the districts in need became an active advocate for their districts.  
Different views on “redistribution.” Among the committee members, there was 
no consensus on whether it would be more desirable to redistribute resources. Some 
members thought that it makes more sense to give more projects and funds to those low-
income districts: 
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This might be considered selfish, but I think the city should assign 
increase the number of assigned committee members from those low-income 
districts, even 1 or 2 more people. We (our district) desperately need welfare and 
public health (Participant #22). 
Gangnam-gu (one of the high-income districts in Seoul) talks about future. 
Something like… designing and planning small-space edible gardens… they call 
it a small city-gardens. But we …? sidewalk… (our district/one of the low-income 
districts) We need to fix sidewalk pavements. Here, it is hard to see just a step 
ahead, but Gangnam-gu already sees what will happen 10 years later (Participant 
#22). 
 
Others had a different view, emphasizing that equality should be considered:  
 
When we tried to allocate resources, it was not let’s give all at once to this 
one district but let’s just help all 25 districts as a whole to spend money 
effectively on welfare. But when I saw the results, which districts won, it was 
different from what we first tried. (Participant #1).  
It is a problem that the districts in which the civic organizations are 
already well organized and active, such as Eunpyeong-gu or Dongdaemun-gu, the 
resource allocation is unequally distributed towards them. Districts like Jung-gu, 
they won nothing. They think Gangdong-gu, Gangnam-gu, and Songpa-gu, these 
districts are really wealthy so they are always the last (Participant #16). 
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A participant who first strongly stated that he considered the district’s overall 
necessity the most, and related himself very much towards equity and redistribution, later 
admitted that the criteria could not fit all project themes: 
 
In fact, parks or environments are usually related to facilities and 
infrastructure. Streams and river… Parks… Well, the equity criterion could have 
been appropriate and fit well due to the project themes in my committee. It might 
be different in other thematic committees… When I saw the winning projects, 
sometimes age group mattered. Youth committee. I saw that the project from 
Seocho-gu (one of the wealthiest districts in Seoul) was selected, in fact, the 
problems and challenges for youth maybe the same anywhere. It might be more 
challenging there, due to the high rents or such circumstances. I thought, in that 
case, the city’s evaluation criteria would make sense. Well, I think the criteria 
given by the city need to be differently applied depending on the project themes 
(Participant #25). 
 
He shared the moment when he realized that the city’s evaluation form might 
make sense in some cases, for example when the problem the project attempts to address 
is related to a certain age group rather than to a specific location. He suggested that the 
criteria given by the city need to be applied differently according to the project themes.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter explored what happened behind the scene, focusing on how 
participants actually made decisions. The findings provide us a better understanding of 
how unintended consequences—redistributive resource allocation—could have 
happened. First, even though the city has put efforts to balance the participants in terms 
of their gender, age, and the districts they live in, the actual participation of committee 
members from low-income districts was more active than those from the high-income 
districts. Some district offices in the low-income districts provided transportation (small 
buses) to the meeting venues or called the committee members in their districts to make 
sure they attend the meetings with the expectation that they will evaluate in favor of the 
proposals submitted in their districts. According to some committee members, the 
committee members of the high-income districts often did not attend the meetings.  
Second, the committee members evaluated the proposals considering “needs” as 
the most important criterion. The findings indicate that participants used their own 
criteria in reviewing and scoring the proposals. Rather than following the eight criteria 
provided in the evaluation form one by one, the participants revealed that they reviewed 
and scored the proposals regarding one or two criteria they thought were the most 
important. The criteria the participants considered were sometimes among the 8 criteria 
provided (needs, urgency, publicness, effectiveness, accomplishment, subject fit, gender 
equality, and project cost appropriateness) or their own, such as whether the idea was 
initiated by a resident not a district office and whether the idea is overlapping with any 
existing city policies. Almost a half of the committee members participated in the 
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interview responded that they focused on whether the proposed project is really necessary 
or the district which the project would be located is in need. In addition, there were also 
committee members who explicitly expressed their considerations of equity and 
redistribution.  
Third, the low-income districts even teamed up with each other to get higher 
scores and more votes. Interview participants revealed that there were some low-income 
districts which formed a team–or a collusion, depending on the perspectives–to vote and 
score higher for each other. Some might consider it as a game-winning strategy; others 
might have seen it unfair. Regardless of how the committee members view the team (the 
collusion) either positively (inevitable) or negatively (unfair), it seems that at least the 
teamwork achieved its goal since the PB processes distributed more projects and funds 
toward the poor neighborhoods. This finding suggests an opportunity for future research. 
It is not surprising that the competition among the districts became intense and the poor 
districts teamed up because PB can add more funds to the district budget as the 
implementations of the winning projects are in charge of district offices. But there are 
many different ways that districts could do “better” in the city-level PB. It would be 
interesting to see the strategies each individual or organization develop within this 
context.  
In sum, PB allowed people from the low-income districts to have a voice in the 
budgeting decision-making process, and since they advocated for their neighborhoods 
actively, compared to those living in the high-income districts, the low-income districts 
could win more projects and funds than their wealthier counterparts. In addition, even 
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those committee members not from the low-income districts have considered ‘needs’ as 
the most important item in the evaluation, which in turn, resulted in evaluating in favor of 
the proposals submitted from the low-income neighborhoods.  
There are at least three limitations of the study. First, this research could only 
capture those who participated in 2 years of the PB cycle (2015-2016), while the previous 
chapter concluded the redistributive effect of PB by studying the 4 years of data from 
2012 to 2015. To address this limitation, I have a plan of replicating the analysis in the 
previous study by limiting the study period to 2015 and 2016 to match the data with this 
study. Second, the findings of the study will be more strengthened if the arguments made 
by the participants can be complemented with some factual data. For example, although 
the participants reported that the committee members from the high-income districts tend 
not to attend the meetings, checking and comparing the actual attendance rate of the 
committee members in terms of their affiliated districts would be beneficial for the 
purpose of increasing validity. Third, there are some possibilities of selection bias due to 
factors beyond my control. Even though the sample of interviewees is relatively well 
distributed in terms of age, gender, and districts, there were some districts that this study 
could not capture. Moreover, the participants who accepted to be interviewed might be 
more politically active than other committee members. It is also possible that they could 
have accepted to participate in the interview because they are in favor of the city’s 
participatory approaches such as PB. Since the sampling frame was not available to me 
due to the privacy protection of the committee members, I had to contact the committee 
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members by attending the meetings. This means that I could not reach out to the members 
who have never come to the committee meetings.   
Despite these limitations, this study offers important contributions to the fields of 
public management and participatory governance. First, this study provided empirical 
evidence for the possible link between civic participation and social justice outcomes. In 
other words, this research explored how the participants made decisions in the 
participatory processes and how it resulted in allocating more resources to the poorer 
neighborhoods than the wealthier counterparts. Second, this research revealed a behind 
story of what happened among the participants that cannot be observed in other publicly 
available records. Even if there was some discrepancy between the factual data and what 
the participants have reported, or even before comparing the factual data with the 
interview contents, this study itself is still meaningful in terms of understanding how the 
participants have experienced and perceived the participatory processes. The narratives 
from the participants will be a good learning material for the practitioners who aims at 
increasing public participation in their decision-making process to understand how the 
ordinary citizens make decisions in those participatory processes with regard to making 
rules and designing the processes.  
 
Notes 
1. In this study, I intentionally used the term “our district” in order to reflect the 
cultural nuance of Korean language. To translate into English accurately, it should 
be “my district,” but in Korean, the word “our” is used to express the group or the 
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members of the group. For example, it is “our family,” “our mother,” and “our 
country” if translate the meaning, not “my family,” “my mother,” and “my 
country.” It may sound weird to native English speakers, but the language itself 
considers the fact that there are other members of the group than “me.”  The term 
“our” does not necessarily include the listener(s) in the conversation, which is the 
case in English, but in Korean, the term “our” includes other group members such 
as family members and other citizens.  
2. The interview protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of 
the Arizona State University (ID: STUDY00004630).  
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Chapter 5 
FINDING THE KEY DETERMINANTS OF A DELIBERATIVE  
PARTICIPATORY PROCESS 
Deliberation has been a significant topic for the scholars interested in 
participatory governance. This significance is because, along with who makes the 
decision, how the decision is made is critical. Direct participation in decision-making can 
occur in the absence of any deliberation. In addition, deliberation can be not related to 
any decision-making. For example, people can vote without any communication process 
of discussing issues and understanding each other’s preferences, and the process of 
people discussing issues is not always connected to voting. In this regard, participation 
and deliberation—voting and deliberation—can be considered complementary (Ferejohn, 
2008). Some scholars even emphasize that the communication process is more important 
than the voting procedure (Ö berg, 2016), because of its educational impact beyond the 
communication (Gastil, 2004). 
Participatory governance scholars recognize PB as a good exemplar practice 
which can achieve the goal of promoting deliberative democracy (Hagelskamp, Rinehart, 
Siliman, & Schleifer, 2016). PB provides a venue for residents not only to gather and 
discuss where to spend the government money but also to vote for the projects they 
would like to see implemented. This setting provides the reason why PB can be 
considered the best example of the combination of direct and deliberative democracy. 
Scholars have recognized that even though PB provides participants opportunities to 
deliberate (Ganuza & Francés, 2012), PB needs to be more deliberative than usually 
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practiced (Hartz-Karp, 2012).  
Despite the significance of the topic, there exists a lack of empirical studies which 
examine the quality of deliberation in how PB is practiced. Not only in the PB setting, but 
also in a broader context, the most critical reason why there is a lack of empirical studies 
is due to the fact that there are not many data collected in a practical or suitable way to 
properly measure deliberation (Thompson, 2008). While many scholars have attempted to 
examine deliberation through participant surveys (Chambers, 1996; Janssen & Kies, 
2005; Ryfe, 2005; Sulkin & Simon, 2001), we still know only a little about how to make 
a process “deliberative” in PB. The challenge of studying deliberation comes from the 
fact that deliberation depends mostly on its context, and therefore, more empirical studies 
which take into account contextual factors of PB are needed.  
 In this regard, this chapter assesses the quality of deliberation and the conditions 
of PB meetings. Using the meeting records available in the case of Seoul, South Korea, 
this study attempts to find the combinations of conditions connected to the deliberative 
meeting process. The data used in this study consists of meeting records of the 32 PB 
thematic committee meetings held in 2016 cycle. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) is used to analyze the cases and find the possible pathways that show a 
deliberative meeting. QCA is appropriate because it is a case-based analytical tool 
developed by adopting a set theory which enables the researcher to explore the conditions 
for the outcome and identify different causal pathways that lead to a specified outcome 
(Ragin, 2008). Based on the findings, I provide recommendations for public managers 
who wish to promote deliberation in their decision-making processes. 
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Literature Review 
Deliberation can be considered a double-edged sword because its effects could be 
positive and negative depending on how it is managed. Literature suggests that public 
deliberation could help people clarify, understand, and refine their own preferences and 
positions on issues (Elster, 1998; Gastil, 2000), distribute information better (Fishkin, 
1995; Gambetta, 1998), and redistribute power among people, therefore make more 
legitimate decisions based on reasons rather than money or power (Cohen, 1989; Fung & 
Wright, 2003). Even after deliberation, on the other hand, cascades within groups could 
be polarized (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006) and their views may become more extreme 
(Schkade, Sunstein, & Hastie, 2010). Therefore, it is important to find how to facilitate 
deliberation in a participatory decision-making process. In this regard, there would be 
two approaches studying deliberation: 1) measuring the quality of deliberation and 2) 
finding determinants that are associated with the deliberative process.  
Measuring the Quality of Deliberation  
Scholars have been developing several indices to evaluate deliberation quality. 
The sets of criteria used to code each speech (or comment in online settings) made by 
individuals vary but several of them can be grouped. 
The most basic element of deliberation is communication. Monologue, speaking by 
oneself, does not offer any benefit to the overall process. In this regard, there should be 
some degree of reciprocity (Borge & Santamarina, 2015; Graham & Witschge, 2003; 
Hagemann, 2002; Schneider, 1997), exchange of opinions (Dahlberg, 2001; Wilhelm, 
1999), interactivity (Rowe, 2015; Trénel, 2004), and therefore it determines the quality of 
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discussion (Westholm, 2003). In addition, when a discussion flows to a non-relevant 
topic, it is obvious that the efforts and time devoted by the participants will be wasted. In 
this regard, whether each speech is relevant to the topic with the index categories such as 
topic (Rowe, 2015), topic relevance (Trénel, 2004), and relevance/quality (Coleman, 
Hall, & Howell, 2002) is important in terms of making a communicative process 
deliberative. 
Moreover, in order to sustain a process deliberative, it is important for the 
participants to respect (Trénel, 2004) each other. The very beginning of the respectful 
deliberation starts from listening (Wilhelm, 1999), and participants are expected to 
attempt to understand the argument from the other’s perspective (Dahlberg, 2001). In 
many cases, however, it is difficult to measure how much one’s speech or attitude is 
respectful or not so often this variable is excluded in empirical evaluations. To address 
this, Steenbergen et al. (2003) and Steiner et al. (2004) have suggested to look at 1) 
whether there are any negative statements about the groups that are to be helped through 
the policies/issues, and whether these comments are implicit or explicit; 2) whether 
counterarguments are ignored/included but degraded/neutrally included/ or included and 
valued.  
One of the key elements of deliberation is providing reasons to justify one’s 
argument, claim, or opinion. When we see a rational-critical debate (Graham & 
Witschge, 2003), the quality (Schneider, 1997; Westholm, 2003) of deliberation is high. 
Rationality (Hagemann, 2002; Wilhelm, 1999) or justification (Borge & Santamarina, 
2015; Rowe, 2015; Steenbergen et al., 2003; Steiner et al., 2004; Trénel, 2004) is usually 
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measured by its level – whether there is any justification meaning that the speaker does 
not present any reasons, there is a simple reasoning provided, or several 
sophisticated/qualified linkages provided to justify one’s argument. Muhlberger (2000) 
also considers universality of justification which means that the provided reasons must be 
acceptable to anyone.  
The deliberative theory also emphasizes the direction of deliberation. The 
participants should consider and reference to the common good (Trénel, 2004). It starts 
with having a sense of empathy (Borge & Santamarina, 2015) and is related to setting the 
topic as conflictual issues (Muhlberger, 2000) which are considered as a social problem 
and public affairs (Hagemann, 2002). Whether the discussion flows in a way that 
considers the common good can be found in the content of justification (Steenbergen et 
al., 2003; Steiner et al., 2004). Rather than being in favor of the issue which would 
benefit a particular individual or group, appeals to the common good either in utilitarian 
terms or in terms of helping the disadvantaged in society (Steenbergen et al., 2003). Also, 
Muhlberger (2000) looks at whether there is any explicit discussion on the relationship 
between self and others. This element values discussion of commitments and 
responsibilities to the community.  
According to Cohen (1989), “ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally 
motivated consensus (Cohen, 1989).” Although reaching a consensus is not an easy task 
in the real world, at least the participants are expected to at least attempt to find solutions 
which are acceptable to all (Steenbergen et al., 2003). In this regard, providing 
alternatives (Rowe, 2015) and making suggestions are crucial; in that way, people are 
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more likely to reach a consensus by discussing different alternatives and finding the best 
option for all. This element is often called constructiveness or constructive politics 
(Steenbergen et al., 2003; Steiner et al., 2004). 
Although elements above are mostly about the settings, so that becomes the 
concern for whoever manages or organizes the process, some scholars consider certain 
attitudes of the participants as well. For example, participants are expected to show 
sincerity (Borge & Santamarina, 2015; Dahlberg, 2001; Muhlberger, 2000) which means 
to make a sincere effort to understand all related information fully and actively 
participate in the process. Everyone participated in the discussion should feel free to 
express his/her opinions (Rowe, 2015; Trénel, 2004). In particular, participants are 
expected to examine their own preferences and cultural values so that reflexivity (Borge 
& Santamarina, 2015; Dahlberg, 2001; Graham & Witschge, 2003) can be considered as 
a measurement. In addition, when the participants present their opinions, it is much 
valued when they share their personal experience (Trénel, 2004) as a narrative (Rowe, 
2015) because personal experience is also a form of information which assists persuasion 
of others (Burkhalter, Gastil, & Kelshaw, 2002).  
Most importantly, however, Equality in access to speech (Borge & Santamarina, 
2015; Dahlberg, 2001; Muhlberger, 2000; Schneider, 1997; Trénel, 2004) is the 
minimum requirement for the desired setting for deliberation. In addition, the discussions 
should not be dominated by few participants. Merely guaranteeing equal opportunity, 
however, is not enough for a high quality of deliberation. Any participant should feel free 
to make any speech, so that openness of discussion (Hagemann, 2002) and autonomy 
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(Dahlberg, 2001) need to be considered as well. Although named as participation, 
Steenbergen et al. (2003) and Steiner et al. (2004) try to take whether one was 
disturbed/interrupted by other participants into account. Furthermore, Inclusion, the 
question of who the participants are is also an important element to consider (Dahlberg, 
2001; Muhlberger, 2000) in order to guarantee to have diverse perspectives in the 
discussions. Moreover, Coleman, Hall, & Howell (2002) take gender balance into 
account as well because male often dominates traditional participatory processes.  
In this regard, this study focuses on whether few participants dominate 
discussions in a meeting. This measure takes Equality in access to speech (Borge & 
Santamarina, 2015; Dahlberg, 2001; Muhlberger, 2000; Schneider, 1997; Trénel, 2004), 
the openness of discussion (Hagemann, 2002) and autonomy (Dahlberg, 2001) into 
account. When a meeting is not dominated by few, the meeting can be considered 
deliberative, as it implies equal access to speech, open discussion, and autonomy.  
Key Determinants of a Deliberative Process  
Deliberative theorists have specified normative conditions that lead to a 
deliberative process. Scholars in the fields of political science, communications, 
sociology, and public policy have widely explored this issue. One thing to note is that the 
elements discussed above can be categorized into two groups. On the one hand, the 
setting of the meetings as a pre-condition for deliberation, which includes elements like 
access to speech, inclusion, diversity of participants and autonomy. On the other hand, 
the quality and characteristics of speech. For instance, how people discussed on what 
kinds of issues can be evaluated by looking at the content, tone, and length of speeches. It 
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is important to distinguish these two aspects because the setting of the meetings could 
affect the quality and characteristics of speech. Thus, several aspects of the quality of 
deliberation measurement index also include the process/meeting settings that lead to the 
deliberative process. Since there is a possibility that institutional design could manipulate 
the results (Tucker, 2008), it is important to study how to make a better design of the 
meetings.  
First, the role of public managers is significant since they are in charge of 
initiating, designing, and guiding the deliberative participatory process. Under this 
category, however, the focus is more on the role the public managers they play in the 
deliberative process. Roberts (1997) suggests that amongst the four approaches to general 
management, the managers who take the generative approach and thus would design the 
participatory process to achieve effectiveness (and efficiency is of minimal interest), can 
facilitate deliberation. The desirable role of public managers is, therefore, “to provide the 
public with alternative visions of what is desirable and possible, to stimulate discussion 
about them, to provoke reexamination of premises and values, and thus to broaden the 
range of potential responses and deepen society's understanding of itself (Reich, 1990, p. 
8).” The process needs to be designed in a way not just aimed to discover what people 
want but provide a setting where the participants can understand each other’s preferences 
(including their own), critically think, and revise what they believe (if they feel 
necessary) (Reich, 1990; Roberts, 1997). In sum, the public manager should not try to 
direct people to what the goal of the manager him/herself or the organization and/or to 
intervene much in the process.  
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Second, as briefly mentioned in the previous section, some elements in the quality 
of deliberation measures are, in fact, about the institutional settings of the meetings. 
Those are inclusion (Dahlberg, 2001; Muhlberger, 2000) and diversity of participants 
(Schneider, 1997). There could be a trade-off, however, between broad participation and 
meaningful exchange between participants since there is a limitation on the capacity that 
each meeting can hold in order to guarantee a meaningful opinion exchange and 
discussion among participants. In addition, the design of the process needs to consider 
not only the number of participants each meeting will hold, but also the representation of 
the people as much as possible - gender, age, ethnicity, and geographic distribution 
(Roberts, 2010). Furthermore, even if equality in access to speech (Borge & Santamarina, 
2015; Dahlberg, 2001; Muhlberger, 2000; Schneider, 1997; Trénel, 2004) is considered, 
the actual discussion might be dominated by a few people in the meeting so that the role 
of facilitator becomes important in leading and moderating discussions.   
Third, the role of facilitators and moderators is also an important factor that 
determines whether a participatory process is deliberative or not. Public managers, in 
some cases, might take a role of moderator/facilitator but in most studies and cases public 
managers and facilitators are distinguished. There are at least three areas which 
considered challenging and thus the role of facilitation is particularly important: 1) the 
handling of expertise, 2) the extent and discourse management, and 3) wrapping up the 
deliberation to a conclusion (Moore, 2012; Ryfe, 2006; Stromer-Galley, 2007). 
Facilitators in practice tend to place a high value on attaining technical expertise, which 
is related to the contents of the issues (Chilvers, 2008), and informing participants in the 
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deliberation is crucial in order to make them all on the same page in terms of 
understanding the issues.  
What Moore (2012) called the processual expertise – promoting good 
deliberation, however, tend not to appear not as much as the importance of interaction the 
interviewed facilitators believe in the study of Chilvers (2008). Facilitators are expected 
to 1) summarize discussion, 2) ask participants who agree or disagree with a certain 
position and make statements on the results, 3) attempt to bring participants back to 
focused topic if necessary, 4) intervene when there is a conflict between participants, and 
5) invite quiet participants to speak (Stromer-Galley, 2007). 
 Based on the discussion above, this study considers six meeting conditions: 1) 
pattern of participation, 2) participation of public managers, 3) the attitude of facilitator, 
4) facilitator’s gender, and 5) participation of female committee members.  
 
The Research Setting 
There are five steps in the Seoul PB process. First, the residents can propose their 
ideas that could solve problems in their neighborhoods. Secondly, public managers in the 
city department review the proposals to check the feasibility of the projects. The city 
officials review the proposals first, but at this stage, city officials only serve to filter 
whether there are any legal or practical issues involved. The notes are attached to each 
proposal for the review in the next step. Thirdly, the idea proposals are reviewed, scored, 
and filtered by the PB thematic committees. Fourthly, ordinary citizens and the PB 
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committee members cast final votes. Lastly, the city council review and approve the 
winning projects unless they find one disqualified. 
The PB committee members, who review, score, and filter proposals, are also 
ordinary citizens who volunteer to participate actively. To become a committee member, 
any resident who 1) has an address, 2) works, or 3) are enrolled in an elementary-, 
middle-, high-school, college, or university in the city of Seoul may apply. The city 
government randomly draws 250 people out of those applied people with a consideration 
of balancing them in terms of gender, age, and location. As a result, the committees are 
comprised of about 10 members each from 25 districts in Seoul. The members can 
continue if they wish to, to serve as a committee member for two years in a row in 
maximum.  
The PB committee members are required to review and score each proposal. The 
members choose, based on their interest, one out of nine PB thematic committees to 
participate. Each committee elects two committee chairs (one male and one female), and 
the committee chairs take turns to play a role of facilitator in the meetings. City managers 
attend the meetings in order to assist the facilitators and provide information if necessary. 
On average, five to seven managers help the logistics such as setting the meeting venue, 
adding up the scores from the committee members. In each thematic committee, 
proposers come to the last meetings to present their project ideas in front of the 
committee members.  
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Data and Methods 
Data 
This study uses 32 stenography meeting records of PB thematic committees held 
in Seoul, South Korea from May to July 2016. The meeting records of thematic 
committees are provided by the city government of Seoul and available to the public 
through the Seoul PB website. In 2016, there were nine thematic committees: 
transportation and housing, urban safety, culture and tourism, welfare, women’s issues 
and health, job opportunities, youth, teenagers, and environmental issues and parks. Each 
thematic committee gathered from three to five times in the 2016 PB cycle. In total, there 
were 33 meetings held from May to July 2016, and there are 32 meeting records available 
(see Table 5.1). The city government of Seoul started to provide these meeting records 
since 2016. In this study, the unit of analysis is a meeting. 
In each meeting, the city hired stenographers and placed several audio recorders 
in front of the microphones which participants used during the discussions. Three to four 
weeks after the meetings, the city government uploaded cleaned meeting records to their 
website archives. The meeting records, which are stenography of each speech, provide 
anyone interested in PB a great opportunity to see what kind of issues the participants 
have discussed, who spoke more than others or not, and how – without having to be 
present at all meetings in person. The data used in this study, particularly the meeting 
records, are unique and important because most of the PB initiatives around the world 
only provides summarized meeting minutes due to many obstacles. 
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Table 5.1 
Available Meeting Records in 2016 
 Meetings  
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total 
Transportation & housing O O O O O 5 
Urban safety O O X X X 2 
Culture & tourism O O O X X 3 
Welfare O O N/A O O 4 
Women’s issues & health O O O O O 5 
Job opportunities O O O O O 5 
Youth O O X X X 2 
Teenagers O O X X X 2 
Environment & parks O O O O X 4 
Total      32 
Note: O: meeting held & records available, X: no meeting held, N/A: not available, 
Shaded cells: meetings that proposers attended to present their ideas. 
 
Methods  
The analysis uses qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in order to find the 
combinations of conditions which lead to the desired outcome—a deliberative meeting, in 
this case. QCA is a case-based analytical tool identifying different causal pathways that 
lead to a specified outcome (Ragin, 2008). QCA adopts a set theory which enables the 
researcher to explore the conditions for the outcome (Ragin, 2008). One of the QCA 
software programs, fsQCA, is used to analyze the data. Among the different types of 
QCA analyses, this study uses a fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) because the distribution of the 
outcome variable is continuous. The number of case is 32 is sufficient for a proper 
analysis of fsQCA (Ragin, 2008). 
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First, the relevant cases are identified and assessed based on the quality of 
deliberation as discussed below under the section desired outcome. In the next phase, the 
cases are assessed by looking at whether a set of conditions appear in each case. In the 
literature, there are several conditions which indicate what is necessary for producing 
good deliberation (see Chambers, 2004, 2005; Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & 
Steenbergen, 2004; Thompson, 2008). In this study, equality of resources (i.e., talents, 
status, and power) in membership and participation, institutional conditions (i.e., the roles 
of facilitators and city officials, diversity of participants), and patterns of participation 
(i.e., level of participation by participants, participant behaviors) are considered.  
In the next phase, “truth table” is constructed, which is the last stage of QCA 
analysis process to find the combinations of conditions that lead to the deliberative 
meetings in this setting. Given the fact that the total number of cases in this study is 32, 
the frequency threshold is set to 1. Consistency threshold was set as 0.9. 
Necessity analysis and sufficiency analysis results will be reported, and therefore 
the sets of conditions which produces a deliberative meeting will be presented. Two 
indicators, consistency and coverage, are used for “assessing two distinct aspects of set-
theoretic connections” (Ragin, 2008, p. 44). Consistency shows “the degree to which the 
cases sharing a given combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in 
question” (Ragin, 2008, p. 44). In other words, by looking at consistency, we can see “the 
degree to which instances of the outcome agree in displaying the causal condition thought 
to be necessary” (Ragin, 2008, p. 44). Meanwhile, coverage assesses “the degree to 
which a cause or causal combination “accounts for” instances of an outcome” (Ragin, 
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2008, p. 44), so that we can examine “the degree to which instances of the condition are 
paired with instances of the outcome” (Ragin, 2008, p. 45). 
Desired Outcome: Identifying a Deliberative Meeting 
The basic features of deliberation include ensuring participants have equal 
opportunities to join the discussion and participants engage fully in the discussion. The 
meeting is considered less deliberative if the fewer participants dominate the discussion 
(see Appendix F for the distributions of speeches by participants in each meeting). This 
study measures the deliberativeness by calculating the variability of the participants’ 
speeches in each meeting by using the relative standard deviation (RSD) or coefficient of 
variation (CV). First, the number of speeches each participant spoke along with the total 
number of speeches in each meeting are counted. Secondly, RSD—standard deviation 
divided by mean—is calculated for each meeting. After this stage, the numbers are 
converted in order to fit the requirements of the QCA method, setting the maximum value 
as 1. Since the higher relative standard deviation indicates that the data points are spread 
out over a wider range of values in relation to the mean, it is considered that the higher 
RSD represents the more distributed participation. A deliberative meeting will be coded 
as 1, and a non-deliberative meeting will be coded as 0, others in between based on its 
relative scores of the RSD.  
Conditions 
The pattern of participation. In order to measure how many participants joined 
the discussions, the number of speakers is divided by the number of attended members 
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(PP). If full participation is achieved, then the meeting is coded as 1. This participation 
does not include idea proposers, public managers, and facilitators.  
Public managers. The extent of public managers’ dominance in each meeting is 
measured by looking at the number of speeches made by public managers divided by the 
total number of speeches in the meeting (PM).  
Participation of facilitators. Similar to public manager’s dominance, the extent 
of facilitators’ dominance in each meeting is measured by taking the number of speeches 
made by facilitators divided by the total number of speeches in the meeting (PF). 
Authoritative facilitator. In each meeting, the facilitator’s speeches are 
examined, and the meeting is coded as 1 if the facilitator 1) did not allow the committee 
members to ask questions to the proposers, 2) cut off discussions, or 3) did not allow the 
participants to exchange opinions (AF). 
Facilitator’s gender. Gender of the facilitator is coded as binary, coded as 1 
otherwise 0 if the facilitator of the meeting is a female. There were 15 meetings which 
had a female facilitator (FF).  
Participation of female committee members. There are two indicators used to 
take the participation of female committee members into the consideration: 1) the number 
of female speakers divided by the number of speakers in the meeting (FP1), and 2) the 
number of speeches made by female speakers divided by the total number of speeches in 
the meeting (FP2).  
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Findings and Discussions 
Quality of Deliberation and Conditions of the Meetings 
 The 32 meetings vary in terms of its quality of deliberation and seven conditions 
considered (see Table 5.2).  
 
Table 5.2 
The Dataset for the Meetings and its Conditions 
id RSD DV PP PM PF AF FF FP1 FP2 
ct1 1.232 0.612 0.875 0.256 0.225 0 0 0.5 0.275 
ct2 0.973 0.484 0.75 0.233 0.137 0 1 0.467 0.28 
ct3 1.589 0.789 0.563 0.031 0.377 0 0 0.444 0.096 
ep1 1.323 0.657 0.714 0.254 0.238 1 1 0.267 0.06 
ep2 1.273 0.632 0.895 0.141 0.251 1 0 0.412 0.261 
ep3 1.338 0.665 0.2 0.086 0.554 1 1 0 0 
ep4 1.014 0.504 0.067 0.114 0.591 0 0 1 0.011 
jo1 1.335 0.663 0.36 0.126 0.273 0 0 0.444 0.211 
jo2 1.163 0.578 0.273 0.304 0.391 1 1 0.333 0.058 
jo3 1.046 0.519 0.5 0.268 0.244 1 1 0.2 0.15 
jo4 1.748 0.868 0.389 0.077 0.533 1 1 0.143 0.016 
jo5 1.037 0.515 0 0.009 0.697 1 0 0 0 
t1 1.026 0.51 0.077 0.595 0.286 0 1 1 0.012 
t2 1.157 0.575 0.308 0.017 0.258 0 0 0.75 0.27 
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th1 1.787 0.888 0.762 0.201 0.394 0 0 0.625 0.249 
th2 1.438 0.714 1 0.183 0.337 0 0 0.467 0.291 
th3 1.578 0.784 0.737 0.172 0.382 0 1 0.571 0.116 
th4 1.835 0.912 0.579 0.01 0.394 0 1 0.364 0.038 
th5 1.682 0.836 0.474 0.041 0.453 0 0 0.333 0.033 
us1 1.008 0.5 0.409 0.188 0.251 1 1 0.444 0.419 
us2 1.735 0.862 0.381 0.094 0.505 0 0 0.5 0.084 
w1 1.403 0.697 0.667 0.192 0.359 1 0 0.5 0.24 
w2 1.146 0.569 0.579 0.218 0.244 0 1 0.545 0.309 
w4 2.013 1 0.867 0.003 0.42 0 1 0.385 0.029 
w5 1.174 0.583 0.267 0.021 0.326 0 0 0.5 0.322 
wh1 1.296 0.644 0.875 0.179 0.293 0 1 0.714 0.299 
wh2 1.478 0.734 0.706 0.211 0.368 0 0 0.667 0.351 
wh3 1.429 0.710 0.545 0.025 0.445 0 0 0.667 0.17 
wh4 1.605 0.797 0.833 0.026 0.386 0 0 0.6 0.174 
wh5 1.639 0.814 0.273 0.006 0.678 0 1 0.333 0.006 
y1 1.399 0.695 0.882 0.126 0.309 0 1 0.333 0.145 
y2 1.835 0.911 0.857 0.044 0.385 0 0 0.333 0.102 
Note. ct: culture & tourism, ep: environment & parks, jo: job opportunities, t: teenagers, 
th: transportation & housing, us: urban safety, w: welfare, wh: women & health, y: youth, 
RSD: Relative standard deviation, DV: converted relative standard deviation (RSD 2.013 
= 1), PP: participation, PM: participation of public managers, PF: participation of 
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facilitators, AF: 1 = authoritative facilitator, FF: 1 = female facilitator, FP1: participation 
of female participants (participants), and FP2: participation of female participants 
(speeches) 
 
First, when comparing the relative deliberativeness of each meeting, there is a 
comparatively wide range of distribution. When comparing the converted value of the 
deliberativeness, the minimum value was 0.484. This was the only value to fall below 
0.5. All the other 31 meetings ranged between 0.5 and 1. The mean of the values 
was .694, and the median was .68. These marginally elevated values indicate PB 
meetings were slightly “deliberative,” meaning that overall participation in each meeting 
was comparatively well distributed—not dominated by few participants. 
 Second, participation (PP), which is measured by the number of participants who 
spoke out relative to the number of attended members, appears to be widely ranged 
(mean: .55, std. dev.: .28). Interestingly, there were four meetings which none of the 
participants except facilitators or public managers speak at all. This happened in the later 
meetings where proposers came to present their ideas and when the facilitators did not 
allow the committee members to ask questions to the proposers. The variation came from 
this aspect, whether the facilitator in the meeting allowed questions and answers among 
proposers and committee members.  
 Third, public managers’ participation (PM) also varied in meetings. In each 
meeting, five to seven public managers attend the meeting to assist in logistics of the 
meeting and answer to questions if there are any. The percentage of the speeches made by 
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public managers in each meeting ranged from 3% to 59.5%. On average, public managers 
made about 14% of the speeches in meetings but dominated the discussion in the teenager 
committee (t1).  
Fourth, facilitators tend neither to dominate the discussions nor authoritative. 
There were, however, about 28% of the meetings which the facilitator behaved 
authoritative (AF). The facilitators in job opportunity committee and environment and 
park committee tend not to allow discussions among committee members, cut off 
discussions, or discourage committee members from asking questions to idea proposers. 
Since the committees were required to elect two committee chairs (one male and one 
female) and the committee chairs take turns to take a role of facilitator, the gender of 
facilitators (FF) in the meetings was quite balanced—about 47% of the meetings had a 
female facilitator.  
Fifth, female participants’ participation (FP1 and FP2) also varied in meetings. It 
is worthwhile to note that, however, even though the number of speakers was quite 
balanced in terms of gender (FP1), the percentage of the speeches made by female 
participants tend to be lower than that of their male counterparts (FP2). There were no 
meetings which went over 50% of the percentage of speeches made by female 
participants.  
QCA Analysis 
fsQCA allows the researchers to examine the multiple combinations of the 
conditions for the outcome (Ragin, 2008). In this case, the desired outcome is a 
deliberative meeting, and seven different conditions are assessed in terms of whether any 
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of the conditions lead to the presence of the desired outcome. Table 5.3 presents the truth 
table—remainders (which are the conditions logically possible but lacking empirical 
instances in this case) are omitted in the table. The key feature of the QCA method is a 
set-theoretic approach. This means that, when interpreting the results, we need to 
remember that 0 and 1 each represent presence and absence. For example, a deliberative 
meeting is considered 1, and therefore, 0 indicates a meeting is not deliberative at all. 
Necessity Analysis. The results of the necessity analysis suggest that there are 
three necessary causes to a deliberative meeting (“~” represents “not”). The consistency 
threshold was set by 0.90 and coverage threshold was set by 0.80.  
1) DV: ~FP2 (consistency: 0.99, coverage: 0.82) 
2) DV: PP or ~FP1 or ~PF (consistency: 0.92, coverage: 0.84) 
3) DV: PP or PM or PF or ~FP1(consistency: 0.90, coverage: 0.87)1 
The first condition suggests that it is necessary to have weak membership in 
female participation in terms of the number of speeches. The second condition suggests 
that it is necessary to have either strong membership in overall participation, or weak 
membership in female participation in terms of the number of participants, or weak  
membership in facilitator’s participation. The third condition suggests that it is necessary 
to have either strong membership in overall participation, or public managers’ 
participation or facilitator’s participation, or weak membership in female participation in 
terms of the number of participants. Overall, the solution consistency was 0.89 and 
coverage was 0.90.  
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Table 5.3  
Truth Table for the Meetings and its Conditions 
 PP PM PF AF FF FP1 FP2 obs consist cases 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.98 ep1 
2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 ep2 
3 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0.98 th3, w2, wh1 
4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0.99 ct2, th4, w4, y1 
5 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 1 th1, wh2, wh3, wh4 
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 ct3, th2, y2 
7 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.94 t1 
8 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 ep3, jo4 
9 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 wh5 
10 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.98 ep4 
11 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0.97 jo2, us1 
12 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.98 t2 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 jo1, th5 
 
Sufficiency Analysis. Sufficiency analysis allows us to find the combinations of 
conditions as “solutions.” Among the three solutions, the parsimonious solutions can be 
understood as fundamentally explanatory conditions of the solution (Rubinson, 2016). 
The parsimonious solutions in this model indicate three paths to a deliberative meeting.  
1) DV = ~PM and ~AF (consistency: 0.82, coverage: 0.74) 
2) DV = ~PM and ~PF (consistency: 0.91, coverage: 0.80) 
3) DV = FF and ~PM (consistency: 0.82, coverage: 0.45) 
The first condition suggests that the meetings are deliberative when the public 
managers are not dominating the discussion, and the facilitators are not authoritative. The 
second condition indicates that the meetings are deliberative when both the public 
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managers and facilitators are not dominating the discussion. Moreover, the third 
condition suggests that the meetings are deliberative when there is a female facilitator, 
and the public managers are not dominating the discussion. Overall, solution consistency 
is 0.82 and solution coverage is 0.98. 
 It is worthwhile to note that some conditions are appeared necessary but not 
sufficient for the desired outcome or vice versa. The findings indicate that different 
conditions affect the necessity and sufficiency of deliberative meeting differently. First, 
strong membership in participation and weak membership in female participation 
appeared as necessary conditions. This means that the meetings need to have most of the 
participants speak rather than having most of them remaining silent and the discussion 
should not be dominated by a certain gender. In contrast, the condition of public 
managers not dominating the discussion is always a part of sufficient conditions. In other 
words, this suggests that it is important for public managers to leave the participants to 
discuss in the meetings, rather than intervening.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the quality of deliberation and the conditions of 32 PB 
thematic committee meetings in Seoul, South Korea. Employing fsQCA method, the 
study examined the combinations of conditions that lead to a deliberative participatory 
process. The findings suggest that there are three pathways to a deliberative meeting. The 
meetings can be deliberative 1) when public managers are not dominating the discussion 
and the facilitators are not being authoritative, 2) when both the public managers and 
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facilitators are not dominating the discussion, or 3) when there is a female facilitator and 
the public managers are not dominating the discussion.  
There are at least three limitations in this study. First, the degree of 
deliberativeness is relatively measured. Among the 32 meetings, the meeting with the 
maximum RSD was considered as the full membership (1) of a deliberative meeting. It is 
important to note that the overall quality of deliberation in the PB meetings of this case 
might be higher or lower than other cases of PB. The focus of this study was comparing 
the meetings with a variety of different settings within the same PB process. It would be 
interesting to compare different PB processes or cases to find out whether the solutions—
the combinations of conditions—can be still applicable. Second, this study tested the 
quality of deliberation based on the variability of the distribution of the speeches and the 
speakers. Although there are many ways of measuring deliberation as discussed in the 
literature review section, this study focused on whether the discussions are dominated by 
few participants due to the limitation of the data. Third, there are no data available on the 
individual attendance throughout the meetings. Due to this fact, those who remained 
silent could not be distinguished with those who did not attend the meetings when 
measuring the patterns of participation. This is the reason why the analysis measured the 
patterns of participation based on the number of speakers relative to the number of 
attendees, not taking the number of people who remained silent into account.  
Despite these limitations, this study makes important contributions to the 
academic field and to those public managers who are interested in promoting deliberation 
in their decision-making process. First, when examining deliberation, this study 
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distinguished pre-conditions for deliberation and the quality and characteristics of 
speeches. In the literature, these elements were often mixed with the factors that affect 
the quality of deliberation, but they need to be distinguished because one can become a 
cause for the other. Second, this study developed a tool to measure a deliberative 
meeting, which is using a relative standard deviation to compare the extent of speech 
domination of each meeting. Since each meeting varies in the number of participants, the 
number of speeches made by each participant and the total number of speeches using 
RSD measures are useful for a valid comparison. Third, it is important to understand the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a deliberative meeting. It is necessary to give all 
participants equal opportunity to speak out and balance the discussions in terms of 
gender. Necessary conditions, however, do not guarantee that a meeting will be 
deliberative. For this, good facilitation is required. Neither public managers nor 
facilitators should dominate the discussions. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation research examines whether participatory budgeting (PB) 
processes, as a case of participatory governance and an innovative solution to local 
governance, promote inclusive and deliberative government decision-making and social 
justice outcomes. Each chapter answers one of the research questions below:  
1. What are the issues that arise when implementing legally mandated PB?  
2. Does PB redistribute resources even without explicit equity principles? 
3. According to PB participants, what makes PB redistributive? 
4. How deliberative are the PB processes? What are the key determinants of a 
deliberative meeting? 
The first study introduced the case, PB in the city of Seoul, South Korea, by 
reviewing the history of PB and the literature on PB in South Korea. It was a timely 
review since it has been about fifteen years since the first PB experiment in South Korea, 
and six years after the mandate. The chapter discussed three issues that arise when 
implementing legally mandated PB in Seoul. First, the issues regarding the current 
government-led process were discussed. In order to make the process more participatory, 
the government needs to consider whether it could hand over the authority of managing 
the process to the PB general committee. The government could be involved in the 
process as one of the participating institutions, together with other civil society 
organizations. Second, I pointed out the matter of defining participants. Although the 
current national law defines residents as persons who have a domicile in the area, PB 
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sometimes more broadly defines residents to include those who work within the area. It is 
noteworthy that the consideration of traditionally neglected groups such as youth and 
minorities is not included in the current mandate. Third, the scope of the mandate was 
discussed. The current mandate only requires each local government unit to include the 
public in the budget formation process. In other words, the decisions made through PB 
are not legally binding.  
The second study examined whether inclusive PB processes redistribute financial 
resources even without the presence of explicit equity criteria. This study employed 
multi-level mixed-effects analysis to account for both project-level and district-level 
determinants with the assumption of the nested structure of the relationship between 
projects and districts. Using the last four years (2012-2016) of resource allocation data in 
Seoul PB, the findings indicated that a poorer district has a higher probability of winning 
a project and is rewarded more funds compared to its wealthier counterparts. These 
results suggest that even without explicit criteria on equity in the PB process in Seoul, the 
funding allocations have redistributed resources to the poor. In addition, inclusiveness, 
which was measured by the types of PB committees required to be installed for each 
district, is another important factor that explains the probability of being selected in the 
final stage for a project and the amount of funds allocated to a district. It was interesting 
to note that the relationship of inclusiveness and PB funding allocation was not simply 
linear. Type C districts that are required to install both thematic and regional sub-
committees in addition to a general PB committee showed no statistical difference from 
type A districts. This finding might imply that there is a certain threshold before which 
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the extent of inclusiveness positively leads to more projects and funds. Moreover, the 
difference in the amount of funds between the types of PB committee appeared greater 
within the district with the highest level of average income than that of the districts with 
the lowest level of average income. Simply put, the wealthiest districts benefit more than 
the poorest district from installing one more sub-committee in addition to a general 
committee (changing from type A committee to type B committee).  
The third chapter explored the possible reasons behind the redistributive effects of 
PB, using interview data from 28 PB participants collected in 2016. The findings provide 
us a better understanding of how unintended consequences—redistributive resource 
allocation—could have happened. The PB process could have been redistributive because 
PB provided a good opportunity for those people living in the comparatively poor 
neighborhood to participate in the government decision-making process. Even though the 
city has put efforts to balance the participants in terms of their gender, age, and the 
districts they live in, the actual participation of committee members from low-income 
districts was more active than those from the high-income districts. Some district offices 
in the low-income districts provided transportation to the meeting venues or called the 
committee members in their districts to encourage them to attend the meetings. In 
addition, when scoring proposals, the participants considered ‘needs’ and ‘urgency’ as 
the most important criteria. Rather than following the criteria provided in the evaluation 
form, the participants revealed that they reviewed and scored the proposals regarding one 
or two criteria they thought were the most important. Furthermore, the low-income 
districts teamed up with each other to get higher scores and more votes. Interview 
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participants revealed that there were some low-income districts which formed a team—or 
a collusion, depending on the perspectives—to vote and score higher for each other. The 
teamwork worked since the poor neighborhoods received more projects and funds in the 
PB process. This chapter provided some possible reasons that PB was redistributive 
based on the participants’ responses. Future studies could take these reasons into 
considerations when examining the redistributive effect of PB.  
The last chapter examined the quality of deliberation and the conditions of 32 PB 
meetings in order to find the combinations of conditions that lead to a deliberative 
participatory process, employing a fuzzy-set QCA. When examining deliberation, this 
study distinguished pre-conditions for deliberation and the quality and characteristics of 
speeches. In the literature, these elements were often mixed with the factors that affect 
the quality of deliberation, but needs to be distinguished because one can become a cause 
for the other. In addition, this study developed a quantified measure of a deliberative 
meeting using a relative standard deviation to compare the extent of speech domination 
of each meeting. Since each meeting varies in its number of participants, the number of 
speeches made by each participant, the total number of speeches, using RSD measures 
are useful for a valid comparison. The results of the QCA analysis revealed necessary 
conditions and sufficient conditions that are connected to a deliberative meeting. It is 
considered necessary to give all participants equal opportunities to speak out and balance 
the discussions in terms of gender. Necessary conditions, however, does not guarantee 
that a meeting will be deliberative. The sufficiency analysis suggests that there are three 
pathways to a deliberative meeting. The meetings can be deliberative 1) when public 
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managers are not dominating the discussion and the facilitators are not being 
authoritative, 2) when both the public managers and facilitators are not dominating the 
discussion, or 3) when there is a female facilitator and the public managers are not 
dominating the discussion.  
This dissertation contributes to the field of public management, and in particular, 
participatory governance by 1) providing a review of the literature on PB in South Korea, 
2) presenting empirical evidence showing that the redistributive effect of PB is possible 
even without explicit equity criteria, and 3) analyzing the set of meeting conditions 
contributed to the quality of deliberation in the context of PB using the empirical data. PB 
has often been criticized that it became a tool for the government to maintain the status 
quo of the participation through cooptation of actors. It is important to note that, 
however, the findings of this dissertation suggest that PB provides an opportunity to those 
population groups that have been neglected in the traditional government decision-
making to actually participate and thus help the government achieve social justice by 
redistributing resources. In addition, the findings suggest that depending on how the 
public manages and facilitators manage the process, the PB meetings can be deliberative, 
which may become a factor that derives redistribution by helping people to make 
decisions based on the reasons, not money or power. In sum, this dissertation adds 
empirical evidence to the theoretical argument that public participation produces 
decisions that well reflect residents’ preferences and it is possible to balance direct and 
deliberative governance.    
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APPENDIX A 
THE PROCEDURE OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN SEOUL
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Source: Seoul PB (2015b) 
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APPENDIX B 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS 
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APPENDIX C 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS, NOT INCLUDING THE 
PROJECTS NOT SELECTED (LOGGED)
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APPENDIX D 
CHARACTERISTICS OF 25 DISTRICTS IN SEOUL
 135 
 
# of 
Households 
Area 
(km2) Population 
Expenditure 
Budget  
(USD 
thousands, 
2008) 
Expenditure 
Budget per 
Capita 
(USD, 2008) 
Jung-gu 61,546 9.96 140,807 295.36 2097.62 
Gangnam-gu 230,755 39.5 569,997 511.81 1498.47 
Mapo-gu 166,722 23.84 393,576 228.24 1473.83 
Dongdaemun-gu 157,650 14.2 375,683 300.02 1216.32 
Dongjak-gu 169,293 16.35 416,268 259.63 914.68 
Jungnang-gu 174,313 18.5 423,655 300.76 897.92 
Geumcheon-gu 104,357 13 260,734 223.12 855.74 
Youngdeungpo-gu 167,685 24.55 426,876 299.68 814.85 
Gangdong-gu 187,490 24.59 492,728 265.22 798.60 
Yangcheon-gu 181,135 17.4 500,533 376.80 752.80 
Guro-gu 171,498 20.12 454,478 320.11 709.92 
Gangseo-gu 223,708 41.43 573,794 291.20 704.35 
Dobong-gu 138,036 20.7 364,454 247.27 702.03 
Gangbuk-gu 142,150 23.6 346,493 316.93 678.47 
Gwanak-gu 247,598 29.57 540,520 302.13 631.84 
Seocho-gu 168,878 47 439,998 244.64 623.71 
Songpa-gu 257,852 33.88 680,150 293.59 601.58 
Yongsan-gu 110,706 21.87 255,294 382.55 579.91 
Gwangjin-gu 158,534 17.06 384,269 231.17 558.96 
Seodaemun-gu 135,104 17.61 324,733 394.98 556.00 
Seongdong-gu 125,848 16.85 306,868 250.05 555.50 
Jongno-gu 75,659 23.91 173,148 255.19 538.27 
Nowon-gu 222,959 35.44 600,829 333.76 507.50 
Eunpyeong-gu 200,502 29.7 505,902 319.65 490.77 
Seongbuk-gu 197,992 24.57 490,639 240.79 431.65 
Source: Seoul Statistics (2015) and the City Government of Seoul (2015) 
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DISTRIBUTIONS OF SPEECHES BY EACH MEETING 
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APPROVAL: EXPEDITED REVIEW 
Daniel Schugurensky 
Public Affairs, School of 
- 
dschugur@asu.edu 
Dear Daniel Schugurensky: 
On 7/25/2016 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
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Type of Review: Initial Study  
Title: Understanding the dynamics behind the redistributive funding 
allocations of participatory budgeting (PB) 
Investigator: Daniel Schugurensky 
IRB ID: STUDY00004630 
Category of 
review: 
(6) Voice, video, digital, or image recordings, (7)(b) Social 
science methods, (7)(a) Behavioral research 
Funding: None 
Grant Title: None 
Grant ID: None 
Documents 
Reviewed: 
• HRP-502c - survey CONSENT DOCUMENT -SHORT 
FORM.docx, Category: Consent Form; 
• Seoul_PB_Survey questions_final.docx, Category: Measures 
(Survey questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions); 
• Parental-Consent.doc, Category: Consent Form; 
• Parental-Consent_Korean.docx, Category: Translations; 
• Seoul_PB_Interview questions_final.docx, Category: Measures 
(Survey questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions); 
• recruitment script.doc, Category: Recruitment Materials; 
• HRP-502c - interview CONSENT DOCUMENT -SHORT 
FORM.docx, Category: Consent Form; 
• Child-Assent-Forms_Korean.docx, Category: Translations; 
• Survey-Consent_Korean.docx, Category: Translations; 
• Translation certification form.pdf, Category: Translations; 
• HRP-503a-Seoul PB_protocol.docx, Category: IRB Protocol; 
• Seoul_PB_Interview questions_Korean.docx, Category: 
Translations; 
• recruitment script_Korean.docx, Category: Translations; 
• Seoul_PB_Survey_questions_Korean.docx, Category: 
Translations; 
• Child-Assent-Forms.doc, Category: Consent Form; 
• Interview-Consent_Korean.docx, Category: Translations; 
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The IRB approved the protocol from 7/25/2016 to 7/24/2017 inclusive. Three weeks 
before 7/24/2017 you are to submit a completed Continuing Review application and 
required attachments to request continuing approval or closure.  
If continuing review approval is not granted before the expiration date of 7/24/2017 
approval of this protocol expires on that date. When consent is appropriate, you must use 
final, watermarked versions available under the “Documents” tab in ERA-IRB. 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103). 
Sincerely, 
IRB Administrator 
cc: Won No 
 
 
